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I. INTRODUCTION
“Whenever you get there, there is no there there.”1
—Gertrude Stein
The United States Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Goodyear2
and Daimler3 significantly narrowed the traditional understanding of
general personal jurisdiction.  Historically, general personal jurisdic-
tion concerned only the defendant’s relationship with the forum, al-
lowing plaintiffs to sue defendants in a particular jurisdiction
irrespective of the claim at issue or where that claim arose.4
Personal jurisdiction was initially limited to strict territorial lim-
its.5  Due to advancements in technology, the Court expanded per-
sonal jurisdiction with the introduction and development of minimum-
contacts analysis.6  The impetus for this initial expansion of personal
jurisdiction from territorial limits to minimum contacts was the con-
cern that potential defendants could enjoy the benefits and protections
of a specific state’s laws while simultaneously being able to dodge the
repercussions of potential liability within that state.
Following the Court’s decision in International Shoe,7 lower courts
and those who teach civil procedure did not question the assertion
that general personal jurisdiction exists where a corporate defendant
is incorporated and where it has its principal place of business.  Such
an articulation of general jurisdiction was, in effect, simply an articu-
lation of domicile jurisdiction that had existed since Pennoyer.8  How-
ever, in addition to this very narrow understanding of general
jurisdiction, lower courts and academics also assumed that general ju-
risdiction could be based on a foreign corporation’s activities within
the forum state, concluding that general jurisdiction over a defendant
may be found where that defendant’s contacts with the forum state
were “continuous and systematic.”9
1. GERTRUDE STEIN, EVERYBODY’S AUTOBIOGRAPHY 289 (1937).
2. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
3. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
4. See Leo Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV.
721, 727 (1988).
5. See discussion infra Parts II–III.
6. Allan R. Stein, The Meaning of “Essentially at Home” in Goodyear Dunlop, 63
S.C. L. REV. 527, 531–32 (2012); Alan M. Trammell, A Tale of Two Jurisdictions,
68 VAND. L. REV. 501, 506 (2015) (citing Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General
Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 620–21 (1988)).
7. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
8. Jack B. Harrison, Here and There and Back Again: Drowning in the Stream of
Commerce, 44 STETSON L. REV. 1, 5–9 (2014).
9. Carol Andrews, Another Look at General Personal Jurisdiction, 47 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 999, 1069 (2012); Charles W. Rhodes, Clarifying General Jurisdiction, 34
SETON HALL L. REV. 807, 812 (2004); Sarah R. Cebik, “A Riddle Wrapped in a
Mystery Inside an Enigma”: General Personal Jurisdiction and Notions of Sover-
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With Goodyear and Daimler, the Court rejected the traditional un-
derstanding of general jurisdiction based on a defendant corporation’s
activities within the forum state, adopting an almost exclusively domi-
cile basis for general jurisdiction.10  These decisions swept away years
of lower court decisions that found general jurisdiction over corporate
defendants based on corporate activities in the forum state.11
In Goodyear and Daimler, the Court rejected arguments that sales
into a forum state by a corporate defendant could form the basis for
general jurisdiction.12  More importantly, the Court also concluded
that that the fairness factors that had run through the Court’s per-
sonal jurisdiction jurisprudence for generations have no applicability
in the general jurisdiction context.13  These two conclusions by the
Court ignore the world of modern commerce and unnecessarily ham-
per plaintiffs pursuing redress for injuries.
In a previous article, I explored the manner in which the Court’s
jurisprudence surrounding the doctrine of specific jurisdiction, partic-
ularly related to the “stream of commerce” theory, greatly hindered
plaintiffs’ efforts to find a convenient forum in which to seek redress
for real injuries.14  This Article continues that discussion within the
context of the Court’s developing jurisprudence in the area of general
jurisdiction and proposes a more balanced approach to the general ju-
risdiction conundrum.
Part II of this Article traces the historical development of the
Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, from the territorial limita-
eignty, 1998 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1, 14 (1998); Emily Eng, A New Paradigm: Domi-
cile as the Exclusive Basis for the Exercise of General Jurisdiction over Individual
Defendants, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 845, 861 (2012); B. Glenn George, In Search of
General Jurisdiction, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1097, 1130 (1990); Allan R. Stein, Styles of
Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX.
L. REV. 689, 758 (1987); Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101
HARV. L. REV. 610, 614 (1988).
10. See Tanya J. Monestier, Where is Home Depot at Home?: Daimler v. Bauman and
the End of Doing Business Jurisdiction, 66 HASTINGS L. J. 233, 260 (2014) (dis-
cussing the meaning of “at home”).
11. See Richard D. Freer, Four Specific Problems with the New General Jurisdiction
5, 8 n.30 (Emory Law Research Paper No. 14-327, 2014), http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=2490034 [https://perma.unl.edu/N7HJ-S9FB] (noting that “a Lexis search
on September 1, 2014 found that no state-court case had ever used the phrase ‘at
home’ within 18 words of ‘general jurisdiction’ in a personal jurisdiction case
before 2011. In contrast, 891 state-court cases had used the phrase ‘continuous
and systematic’ within 18 words of ‘general jurisdiction’ in such cases.”).
12. Id. at 6.
13. Id.; Monestier, supra note 10, at 263 (citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct.
746, 762 n.20 (2014)) (“. . . the Court, on the other hand, is of the view that the
reasonableness test applies only to assertions of specific jurisdiction, not to asser-
tions of general jurisdiction. This is because the nature of general jurisdiction is
such that it is de facto fair and reasonable to require a defendant to answer to
suit in that particular forum.”).
14. See generally Harrison, supra note 8.
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tions of Pennoyer v. Neff15 to the abandonment of this overly restric-
tive approach because of the development of the modern, mobile
industrial state of the twentieth century.  Part III of this Article then
looks at the Court’s modern development of personal jurisdiction doc-
trine, specifically, the Court’s conclusion in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington that contacts with a forum may serve as a substitute for
actual physical presence in the forum.16  Part IV examines the role of
“fairness” in the analysis of personal jurisdiction, as articulated by the
Court in World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson,17 where the Court out-
lined the factors to be employed in determining reasonableness.18
Part V analyzes the continued existence of general jurisdiction after
International Shoe, looking specifically at the Court’s decisions in Per-
kins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.19 and Hall v. Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A.,20 in which the Court continued to hold
that exercise of general personal jurisdiction over a foreign corpora-
tion was appropriate where that corporation had “continuous and sys-
tematic contacts” with the forum.  Part VI reviews the Court’s
decisions in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown21 and
Daimler AG v. Bauman,22 questioning the continued viability of the
doctrine of general personal jurisdiction after these decisions.  Part
VII of this Article examines whether a foreign corporation’s compli-
ance with a state registration statute provides a basis for that state to
exercise general personal jurisdiction over the foreign corporation.23
In conclusion, this Article proposes that despite the Court’s deci-
sions in Goodyear and Daimler, the Court should, at a minimum,
adopt an approach to general jurisdiction whereby a corporation that
registers to do business in a state, appoints an agent for service of
process in the state, and actually conducts business in the state con-
15. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
16. Int’l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
17. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
18. Those factors include: (1) “the burden on the defendant,” (2) “the forum State’s
interest in adjudicating the dispute,” (3) “the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining con-
venient and effective relief,” (4) “the interstate judicial system’s interest in ob-
taining the most efficient resolution of controversies,” and (5) “the shared interest
of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.” Id.
at 292 (citing McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957); Kulko v. Cal.
Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92–93, 98 (1977); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,
211 n.37 (1977)).
19. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
20. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
21. 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2854 (2011).
22. 134 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2014); see John N. Drobak, Personal Jurisdiction in a Global
World: A Comment on the Supreme Court’s Recent Decisions in Goodyear Dunlop
Tires and Nicastro, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1707 (2013); Wendy Collins Perdue, What’s
“Sovereignty” Got to Do with It? Due Process, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Su-
preme Court, 63 S.C. L. REV. 729, 729 (2012).
23. See discussion infra Part VII.
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sents to general jurisdiction in that state, particularly for injuries to
citizens of that state that occur outside the state.24  This Article also
asserts that, consistent with the Court’s opinion in Burnham, where a
corporation’s statutorily appointed agent is properly served within a
state, that state may properly exercise personal jurisdiction over that
corporation.  Additionally, this Article argues that the Court should
revisit its rejection of the fairness factors in the general jurisdiction
context in order to restore the balance between the interest of a plain-
tiff seeking redress in her home state and the burden on foreign de-
fendants whose “continuous and systematic” contacts in the forum
state require them to defend in the forum state.25
II. IN THE BEGINNING WAS “PRESENCE”
The concept of personal jurisdiction has, of necessity, evolved with
the growth of commerce and the development of new technology.26
However, before addressing the current state of affairs regarding per-
sonal jurisdiction, one must first examine the historical development
of the doctrine of personal jurisdiction.  While the concept of personal
jurisdiction finds its constitutional roots in the Due Process Clause,
the earliest important cases to discuss the concept of personal jurisdic-
tion focused on events that occurred prior to the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868.  These early cases were deeply
rooted in the fundamental concept of state sovereignty as the primary
basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.27
24. See discussion infra Part VIII.
25. See discussion infra Part VIII.
26. See discussion supra Part I.
27. Stephen Higdon, If It Wasn’t on Purpose, Can a Court Take It Personally?: Untan-
gling Asahi’s Mess that J. McIntyre Did Not, 45 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 463, 467
(2013) (noting that personal jurisdiction initially was a function of state-by-state
common law before developing constitutional roots); Patrick J. Borchers, The
Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to
Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19, 25 (1990); see Allan Erben,
Impersonal Jurisdiction, 60 EMORY L.J. 1, 96 (2010); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714, 719 (1877); Galpin v. Page, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 350, 354 (1873).
In Galpin v. Page, both an heir and a grantee claimed title for a piece of real
property located in San Francisco, California. Galpin, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at
351–52.  At issue before the Court was whether any determination reached by the
courts below was valid, given a necessary party who was domiciled outside of
California and who held a potential interest in the property at issue had not been
served in the state. Id. at 353.  In fact, the only service on the out-of-state party
had been by publication. Id.  In reviewing this issue, the Court determined that
the judgment reached by the court below was void because publication service on
the out-of-state defendant was invalid. Id. at 359.  The primary concern of the
Court in Galpin was preserving the sovereign jurisdictions of the individual
states. Id. at 373.  In reaching its conclusion, the Court stated:
The tribunals of one State have no jurisdiction over the persons of
other States unless found within their territorial limits; they cannot ex-
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As most first-year law students discover early in their law school
careers, the modern origins of personal jurisdiction began with Pen-
noyer v. Neff.28  In Pennoyer, an attorney brought an action against
his client, Neff, for unpaid legal fees in Oregon.29  As in Galpin v.
Page, service on Neff was attempted by publication in a newspaper.
Neff was not personally served.30  Default judgment was then
awarded to the attorney when Neff failed to respond or appear.31  In
order to satisfy the judgment, the attorney took action to seize prop-
erty owned by Neff in Oregon, with the property subsequently being
sold at a sheriff’s auction.32  At the auction, the attorney purchased
the land and then assigned the rights to the property to Pennoyer.33
Shortly thereafter, Neff sued Pennoyer for quiet title.34  In effect,
Neff argued that the original judgment against him was invalid be-
cause the original court did not have proper personal jurisdiction over
him, in that he did not reside within the jurisdiction of the Oregon
court and, thus, was not properly served.35  The district court found
the original judgment against Neff invalid, determining that the prop-
erty continued to belong to Neff.36  The case was then appealed, and
the Supreme Court granted certiorari.37
In an opinion by Justice Field, the Court held that the authority of
every lower court is restricted by the territorial limits of the state
where it is established.38  However, for the development of personal
tend their process into other States, and any attempt of the kind would
be treated in every other forum as an act of usurpation without any bind-
ing efficacy.
Id. at 367.  The Court reasoned that “[j]udgment without jurisdiction is unavail-
ing for any purpose.” Id. at 373.  Thus, the Court laid the foundation for a per-
sonal jurisdiction problem that has confused and troubled courts up to the
present.
28. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 714.
29. Id. at 719–20.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 719.
34. Neff v. Pennoyer, 17 F. Cas. 1279, 1280 (C.C.D. Or. 1875), aff’d, 95 U.S. 714
(1877).
35. Id. at 1280–81.
36. Id. at 1290.
37. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 714.
38. Id. at 720.  In so holding, the Court stated:
[A] State, through its tribunals, may subject property situated within its
limits owned by non-residents to the payment of the demand of its own
citizens against them; and the exercise of this jurisdiction in no respect
infringes upon the sovereignty of the State where the owners are domi-
ciled. Every state owes protection to its own citizens; and, when non-
residents deal with them, it is a legitimate and just exercise of authority
to hold and appropriate any property owned by such non-residents to
satisfy the claims of its citizens.
Id. at 723.  The Court further reasoned:
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jurisdiction, the critical analysis in Pennoyer rested upon linking the
concept of personal jurisdiction with the constitutional requirements
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.39  Thus, Pen-
noyer allowed a state court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant only when that defendant was served within
the territorial bounds of the state, when the defendant voluntarily ap-
peared before the court for the proceedings, or when property owned
by the defendant within the territorial bounds of the state was at-
tached prior to the filing of the lawsuit.40
In the years following Pennoyer, the Court continued to wrestle
with the concept of personal jurisdiction and due process.  For exam-
The several States are of equal dignity and authority, and the indepen-
dence of one implies the exclusion of power from all others. And so it is
laid down . . . as an elementary principle, that the laws of one State have
no operation outside of its territory, except so far as is allowed by comity;
and that no tribunal established by it can extend its process beyond that
territory so as to subject either persons or property to its decisions.
Id. at 722; see Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and
the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts; From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Re-
view, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 571 (1958).
39. As stated by the Court:
Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Consti-
tution, the validity of such judgments may be directly questioned, and
their enforcement in the State resisted, on the ground that proceedings
in a court of justice to determine the personal rights and obligations of
parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due
process of law. Whatever difficulty may be experienced in giving to those
terms a definition which will embrace every permissible exertion of
power affecting private rights, and exclude such as is forbidden, there
can be no doubt of their meaning when applied to judicial proceedings.
They then mean a course of legal proceedings according to those rules
and principles which have been established in our systems of jurispru-
dence for the protection and enforcement of private rights. To give such
proceedings any validity, there must be a tribunal competent by its con-
stitution—that is, by the law of its creation — to pass upon the subject-
matter of the suit; and, if that involves merely a determination of the
personal liability of the defendant, he must be brought within its juris-
diction by service of process within the State . . . .
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733; see also Higdon, supra note 27, at 467 (noting that the
Court continued the states’ approach, however the Court also utilized the Due
Process Clause to check the states’ use of personal jurisdiction); Cebik, supra note
9, at 4 (stating that “[t]he Court further held that whether a court had personal
jurisdiction over the defendant was a constitutional matter rooted in the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Kurland, supra note 38, at 572
(indicating the importance of Pennoyer’s holding to be its application of the Due
Process Clause).
40. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 723, 733; Higdon, supra note 27, at 467–68; Danielle Keats
Citron, Minimum Contacts in a Borderless World: Voice over Internet Protocol
and the Coming Implosion of Personal Jurisdiction Theory, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1481, 1505 (2006); Michael B. Mushlin, The New Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction: New
York’s Revival of a Doctrine Whose Time Has Passed, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 1059,
1067–68 (1990).
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ple, in St. Clair v. Cox,41 the Court affirmed its prior holdings that
“[p]ersonal service of citation on the party or his voluntary appearance
is, with some exceptions, essential to the jurisdiction of the court.”42
In defining what those exceptions might be, the Court stated that
“[t]he exceptions related to . . . where proceedings are taken in a
[s]tate to determine the status of one of its citizens towards a non-
resident, or where a party has agreed to accept a notification to others
or service on them as citation to himself.”43  The Court also went on in
St. Clair to confirm that the same requirements applied to corpora-
tions that apply to natural persons.44
Over the ensuing years, the analysis of personal jurisdiction based
on a defendant’s physical presence and the territorial sovereignty of
the states found in Pennoyer formed the linchpin of courts’ application
of the concept of personal jurisdiction.
III. WHEN “PRESENCE” CEASED TO MEAN “PRESENCE”
As modern commerce developed in the twentieth century, business
entities increasingly engaged in commerce in multiple states, includ-
ing many states in which the business had no “presence” as that con-
cept had been articulated in Pennoyer.  With this development, the
requirement of physical presence allowing a court to exercise personal
jurisdiction over out-of-state business entities conducting commerce
within the state became increasingly unworkable.45  As a result, to
exercise personal jurisdiction over out-of-state entities, courts were in-
creasingly forced to create legal fictions revolving around consent in
order to find the “presence” required by Pennoyer.46
To address the increasingly complicated jurisdictional conundrums
that arose as courts struggled with the need to protect in-state citizens
from the in-state activities of out-of-state commercial entities, the
41. 106 U.S. 350 (1882).
42. Id. at 353.
43. Id. (citing Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 714).
44. Id.
45. LARRY L. TEPLY & RALPH U. WHITTEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 214 (3d ed. 2004) (stat-
ing that “[a] corporation, like an individual, could consent to suit in a fo-
rum . . . [but] [i]n the absence of actual consent, the traditional rule was that a
corporation could not be sued outside [their] state [of incorporation]”); see also
SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, CIVIL PROCEDURE 93–94 (2005) (noting the shift to away
from a territorial approach to a transactional approach that assessed minimum
contacts).
46. Erik T. Moe, Comment, Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court: The Stream
of Commerce Doctrine, Barely Alive but Still Kicking, 76 GEO. L.J. 203, 206
(1987); see also Angela M. Laughlin, This Ain’t the Texas Two Step Folks: Dishar-
mony, Confusion, and the Unfair Nature of Personal Jurisdiction Analysis in the
Fifth Circuit, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 681, 688–89 (2009) (noting states solved the
problem of corporations’ consent to personal jurisdiction with the appointment of
agents and notions of implied consent).
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Court needed to develop a more flexible approach than it had estab-
lished in Pennoyer.47  In International Shoe Co. v. Washington,48 the
Court moved beyond the rigid requirement of physical presence it had
established in Pennoyer and articulated a new definition of “pres-
ence.”49  The Court in International Shoe concluded that the exercise
of personal jurisdiction is appropriate when an out-of-state defendant
has “certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.’”50
In International Shoe, the State of Washington sued the Interna-
tional Shoe Company in Washington state court.51  The suit was filed
to obtain contribution payments to the state unemployment compen-
sation fund.52  The International Shoe Company was a Delaware cor-
poration with its principal place of business in St. Louis, Missouri.53
It maintained places of business in several states, not including Wash-
ington, where it carried on its manufacturing and from where it dis-
tributed its merchandise interstate.54  International Shoe had no
office or stock in the State of Washington and only maintained eleven
to thirteen salesmen under the direct supervision of a sales manager
in St. Louis, Missouri.55
Nonetheless, the Court held that the exercise of jurisdiction by the
Washington state court was appropriate because constitutional due
process requires only that a defendant have certain minimum contacts
within the forum state such that maintenance of the suit does not of-
fend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”56  In its
opinion, the Court redefined what was meant by “presence” in deter-
mining whether a state court could exercise personal jurisdiction over
an out-of-state defendant, stating “ ‘present’ or ‘ presence’ are used
merely to symbolize those activities of the corporation’s agent within
the state which courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the de-
mands of due process.”57
The Court has reasoned that this move away from the rigidity of
Pennoyer became necessary due to advances in technology and modern
47. See ISSACHAROFF, supra note 45, at 93–94.
48. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
49. Id. at 316–17.
50. Id. at 316.
51. Int’ l Shoe Co. v. State, 22 Wash. 2d 146, 147 (1945), aff’d sub nom. Int’l Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
52. Int’ l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 311.
53. Id. at 313.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 316 (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
57. Id. at 316–17.
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commerce in the twentieth century.58  Moreover, in addressing the
concept of “presence” in International Shoe, the Court stated:
‘Presence’ in the state in this sense has never been doubted when the activi-
ties of the corporation there have . . . been continuous and system-
atic . . . . Conversely it has been generally recognized that the casual presence
of the corporate agent or even his conduct of single or isolated items of activi-
ties in a state in the corporation’s behalf are not enough to subject it to suit on
causes of action unconnected with the activities there.59
While the Court did not articulate a clear boundary line between
those activities that would subject a foreign defendant to suit and
those that would not, the Court noted that the criteria could not be
“simply mechanical or quantitative.”60  The Court stated that for the
acts to be enough to subject a foreign defendant to suit, those acts are
to be judged based on their “nature and quality and the circumstances
of their commission.”61  The Court reasoned that “to the extent that a
corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activities within a
state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of that state”
and “[t]he exercise of that privilege may give rise to obliga-
tions . . . which [require] the corporation to respond to a suit brought
to enforce them.”62
In analyzing the nature of activity in a forum state required to
show “presence,” the Court focused on the burden or “inconveniences”
on the corporate defendant if it were required to litigate in the fo-
rum.63  The Court then discussed a continuum of cases involving the
question of personal jurisdiction, focusing on different types of activity
within the forum state.64  Arising out of this continuum was our mod-
ern understanding of the categories of specific and general
jurisdiction.65
58. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 753–54 (2014) (“In time, however, that
strict territorial approach yielded to a less rigid understanding, spurred by
‘changes in the technology of transportation and communication, and the tremen-
dous growth of interstate business activity.’”) (quoting Burnham v. Superior
Court, 495 U.S. 604, 617 (1990)) (plurality opinion of Scalia, J.).
59. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317 (citations omitted).
60. Id. at 319.
61. Id. at 318.
62. Id. at 319.
63. Id. at 317 (“[a]n ‘estimate of the inconveniences’ which would result to the corpo-
ration from a trial away from its ‘home’ or principal place of business is relevant
in this connection.”) (quoting Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139,
141 (2d Cir. 1930)).
64. Id. at 317–18.
65. See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966) (“In American thinking,
affiliations between the forum and the underlying controversy normally support
only the power to adjudicate with respect to issues deriving from, or connected
with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction to adjudicate. This we call
specific jurisdiction. On the other hand, American practice for the most part is to
exercise power to adjudicate any kind of controversy when jurisdiction is based
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At one end of the continuum, and perhaps the easiest cases, were
those cases where personal jurisdiction was based on the cause of ac-
tion arising out of the corporate defendant’s contacts in the state.  The
Court described these cases as follows:
‘Presence’ in the state [as a basis for personal jurisdiction] has never been
doubted when the activities of the corporation there have not only been con-
tinuous and systematic, but also give rise to the liabilities sued on, even
though no consent to be sued or authorization to an agent to accept service of
process has been given.66
These cases would be those now typically characterized as cases in-
volving specific personal jurisdiction.
At the other end of the continuum were those cases where it was
argued that personal jurisdiction existed because of the casual pres-
ence of a corporate agent in the forum state or some single isolated act
by a corporate defendant in the forum state, even though the cause of
action itself did not arise in the forum state or as a result of the corpo-
rate defendant’s contact with the forum state.67  In these cases, the
Court determined that personal jurisdiction would not exist, holding
“the casual presence of the corporate agent or even his conduct of sin-
gle or isolated items of activities in a state in the corporation’s behalf
are not enough to subject [the corporate defendant] to suit on causes of
action unconnected with the activities there.”68  In arriving at this
conclusion, the Court examined the burden on the corporate defendant
on being forced to defend itself in a forum where it had only an iso-
lated casual contact.69  As the Court explained, requiring “the corpo-
ration in such circumstances to defend the suit away from its home or
on relationships, direct or indirect, between the forum and the person or persons
whose legal rights are to be affected. This we call general jurisdiction.”).  Note
that some authors have questioned the utility of this bipartite framework. See
Monestier, supra note 10, at 237–246; Andrews, supra note 9, at 1075 (“Finally,
some courts and commentators have suggested that jurisdiction is proper in cases
that fall between the definitions or categories of specific and general jurisdiction.
They object to strict characterization of a case as falling in one category or the
other. They suggest either a ‘sliding scale’ or ‘hybrid’ approach. Professor Rich-
man proposes a sliding scale theory, and Professor Simard a hybrid form of juris-
diction. The theories vary slightly, but both would find proper jurisdiction in fact
patterns that are ‘near misses’ on both the relatedness and extent of contacts
factors.” (footnotes omitted)).
66. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317 (citing Int’l Harvester Co. of Am. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S.
579 (1914); St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co. of Tex. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218 (1913); Com-
mercial Mut. Accident Co. v. Davis, 213 U.S. 245, 255–56 (1909); Pa. Lumber-
man’s Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 197 U.S. 407, 414–15 (1905); Conn. Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602, 610–11 (1899); St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350,
355 (1882)).
67. Id. (citing Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass’n of Indianapolis v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8,
21 (1907); Cox, 106 U.S. at 359–60; Frere v. Louisville Cement Co., 134 F.2d 511,
515 (D.C. Cir. 1943)).
68. Id.
69. Id.
488 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:477
other jurisdiction where it carries on more substantial activities has
been thought to lay too great and unreasonable a burden on the corpo-
ration to comport with due process.”70
In between these two extremes on the continuum were those cases
where it was asserted that personal jurisdiction existed because the
corporate defendant had substantial “continuous and systematic” con-
tacts with the forum state, even though the cause of action itself did
not arise in the forum state or as a result of the corporate defendant’s
contact with the forum state.71  In these cases, the Court concluded
that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the corporate defendant
was appropriate when the corporate defendant had substantial “con-
tinuous and systematic” contacts with the forum state,72 stating
“there have been instances in which the continuous corporate opera-
tions within a state were thought so substantial and of such a nature
as to justify suit against [the corporate defendant] on causes of action
arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.”73  This
analysis led to the development of what became characterized as gen-
eral personal jurisdiction.
IV. WHAT’S “FAIRNESS” GOT TO DO WITH IT?
In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court was faced with the question
of whether an Oklahoma state court could exercise personal jurisdic-
tion over a nonresident automobile retailer and its wholesale distrib-
uter in a products liability action when the retailer and distributor
had placed the automobile in the stream of commerce and when the
automobile subsequently caused harm in the forum state.74
In World-Wide Volkswagen, a family purchased a new Audi auto-
mobile from a retailer in New York who obtained it from a local dis-
tributer who served New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut.75  A
year after purchasing the automobile, the family left New York to
move to their new home in Arizona.76  En route to Arizona, the family
drove the Audi through the state of Oklahoma, where another vehicle
struck their Audi in the rear.77  The collision caused a fire that se-
verely burned the mother and her two children.78
70. Id.
71. Id. at 318.
72. Id. (citing Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. v. Reynolds, 255 U.S. 565 (1921) (per curiam); St.
Louis Sw. Ry. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218 (1913); Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co.,
115 N.E. 915 (N.Y. 1917)).
73. Id.
74. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 287 (1980).
75. Id. at 288–89.
76. Id. at 288.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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Subsequently, the family filed suit in Creek County, Oklahoma
state court, listing the retailer and distributer as two of many defend-
ants in their products liability action.79  After the retailer and distrib-
uter made a special appearance to contest personal jurisdiction, the
District Court for Creek County ruled that they were subject to the
court’s jurisdiction.80  Similarly, on appeal, the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma held that jurisdiction was authorized.81  The U.S. Supreme
Court subsequently granted certiorari.82
The Court held that jurisdiction was not proper because the re-
tailer and distributer had no “contacts, ties, or relations” with
Oklahoma at all.83  The Court reasoned that the retailer and distrib-
uter carried on no activity, sales, services, or business with the state
and thus availed themselves of none of the privileges and benefits of
Oklahoma law.84
Justice White, writing for the Court, succinctly described the de-
velopment of the doctrine of personal jurisdiction, explaining that the
concept of minimum contacts from International Shoe performed two
distinguishable functions.85  Those functions included protecting de-
fendants against the burden of litigating in a “distant or inconvenient
forum” and ensuring that states do not reach “beyond the limits im-
posed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal sys-
tem.”86  The Court explained that the first function of protecting
defendants is “typically described in terms of ‘reasonableness’ or
‘fairness.’”87
However, the Court noted that the “Due Process Clause, in its role
as a guarantor against inconvenient litigation . . . [has] been substan-
tially relaxed over the years” because of modern transportation and
communication.88  The Court went on to note that it would be a mis-
take to assume that this trend would lead to the demise of all personal
79. Id.
80. Id. at 288–89.
81. The Court further clarified that “[a]lthough the court noted that the proper ap-
proach was to test jurisdiction against both statutory and constitutional stan-
dards, its analysis did not distinguish these questions, probably
because . . . [Oklahoma’s “long-arm” statute] has been interpreted as conferring
jurisdiction to the limits permitted by the United States Constitution.” Id. at
289–90.
82. Id. at 290.  The Court granted certiorari in this case to resolve the same conflict
in Kansas, Colorado, Utah, and Washington. Id. at 290 n.9.
83. Id. at 299.
84. Id. at 295.
85. Id. at 291.
86. Id. at 292.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 292–93.  The Court further noted that the historical developments noted in
McGee have only further accelerated in the generation since. Id. at 293 (citing
McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957)).
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jurisdiction restrictions.89  In addition, Justice White noted that the
Court had never accepted the proposition that state lines were irrele-
vant for jurisdictional purposes because it was vital to remain faithful
to the principles of interstate federalism embodied in the
Constitution.90
The Court also synthesized the factors hinted at in other cases that
apply in determining reasonableness.91  Those factors include: (1) “the
burden on the defendant;” (2) “the forum State’s interest in adjudicat-
ing the dispute;” (3) “the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient
and effective relief;” (4) “the interstate judicial system’s interest in ob-
taining the most efficient resolution of controversies;” and (5) “the
shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental sub-
stantive social policies.”92
Next, the Court addressed the requirements of “foreseeability”
within a court’s analysis of personal jurisdiction.93  The plaintiffs as-
serted that “because an automobile is mobile by its very design and
purpose it was ‘foreseeable’ that [it] would cause injury in
Oklahoma.”94  In addressing this contention, the Court rejected the
plaintiffs’ argument.  Rather, the Court held that when addressing the
question of foreseeability, a court should focus on whether “the defen-
dant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he
should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there” rather than
the “mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum
State.”95
V. THE DOCTRINE OF GENERAL JURISDICTION AFTER
INTERNATIONAL SHOE
In International Shoe, the Court expanded the reach of a state’s
jurisdiction by moving beyond the defendant’s actual “presence” re-
quired by Pennoyer and adopting an analysis focused on the nature of
a defendant’s contacts with the forum state and on fairness.96  In light
89. Id. at 294 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250–51 (1958)).
90. Id. at 293.
91. Id. at 292.
92. Id. (citing Kulko v. Cal. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92–93, 98 (1977); Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211 n.37 (1977); McGee v. Int’ l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220,
223 (1957)).
93. Id. at 295–99.
94. Id. at 295.
95. Id. at 297.
96. This expansion continued to evolve post-International Shoe.  Burnham v. Supe-
rior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 610 (1990) (plurality opinion of Scalia, J.) (citing
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984) (ex-
plaining that the history of cases after International Shoe permit deviations from
traditional restrictions on personal jurisdiction “but only with respect to suits
arising out of the absent defendant’s contacts with the State.”)).  Twelve years
after International Shoe, Justice Black wrote an opinion sustaining California’s
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of the Court’s subsequent decisions in Goodyear and Daimler, it is im-
portant to note the concerns raised by Justice Black in his concurring
opinion.97  Justice Black was concerned that the approach adopted in
International Shoe could ultimately lead to a narrowing of a state’s
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, rather than expanding that
jurisdiction.98  As Professor Michael Hoffheimer has written:
While every member of the Court agreed that personal jurisdiction over Inter-
national Shoe Co. was constitutional, Justice Black wrote separately to ex-
press concern that the new policy-oriented approach could restrict state power
over a nonresident corporation doing business in the state.  For Justice Black,
a nonresident corporation engages in activity in a state only by grace of the
state’s law, and the state may condition its recognition of the corporation on
the corporation’s consent to jurisdiction in the state’s court.  While Justice
Black’s vision of state power lost traction over time, his warning that Interna-
tional Shoe’s approach could reduce as well as expand personal jurisdiction
was prescient.99
A. Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.
In Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.,100 the Court, for
the first time after International Shoe, addressed the issue of the
reach of general personal jurisdiction. Perkins involved the Benguet
Consolidated Mining Co., which held and operated gold and silver
mines in the Philippines.101  The corporation stopped mining opera-
tions during World War II and its president returned to his home
state of Ohio.102  In Ohio, the corporation’s president kept an office,
maintained the corporate records, and conducted some business for
the corporation.103  Corporate funds were maintained in Ohio banks
exercise of personal jurisdiction over a claim arising from a nonresident insur-
ance company’s sale of one life insurance policy in the state.  McGee v. Int’l Life
Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).  The opinion expressly referred to the judicial trend
of expanding the reach of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 222 (“Looking back over
this long history of [personal jurisdiction decisions,] a trend is clearly discernible
toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corpora-
tions and other nonresidents.  In part this is attributable to the fundamental
transformation of our national economy . . . .”).
97. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 326 (1945) (Black, J., concurring).
98. Id.
99. Michael H. Hoffheimer, General Personal Jurisdiction After Goodyear Dunlop
Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 549, 561–62 (2012).
100. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
101. Id. at 439.
102. Id. at 447.  The state court found that the corporation’s surface operations were
destroyed, but the court did not explain how or by whom.  Perkins v. Benguet
Consol. Mining Co., 95 N.E.2d 5, 8 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950), aff’d, 98 N.E.2d 33 (Ohio
1951), vacated, 342 U.S. 437 (1952).  During the years of World War II, three of
Benguet’s five directors suffered internment by the Japanese. Id.  In 1945, John
W. Haussermann, Jr. was named a director of Benguet to replace a director who
had been killed by the Japanese in 1944. Id.
103. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447–48.  The president had a long connection with Clermont
County, Ohio, where he had a farm and personal office. Perkins, 95 N.E.2d at 7.
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and a specific Ohio bank was identified as the transfer agent for the
corporation’s stock.104  While based in Ohio, the corporation’s presi-
dent disbursed funds and subsequently coordinated the rebuilding of
the foreign mining facilities.105  The directors of the corporation met
at both the president’s home in Ohio and at the corporate offices in
Ohio.106  While the corporation had significant contact with Ohio, it
did not reincorporate in Ohio, formally establish a principal place of
business there, or appoint an agent for service of process in Ohio.107
A lawsuit was brought alleging a failure on the part of the corpora-
tion to issue dividends and stock certificates.108  The lawsuit was filed
in Ohio state court, and service of summons was made on the corpora-
tion’s president.109  The trial court, however, granted the defendant’s
motion to quash the summons concluding that Ohio courts lacked per-
sonal jurisdiction over the corporate defendant because the corpora-
tion was a foreign corporation and the conduct complained of did not
result from any contacts the corporation had with Ohio.110  The Ohio
Supreme Court affirmed this decision, and the petitioner subse-
quently appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.111
In holding that due process allowed Ohio courts to exercise juris-
diction over the corporation, even though the claims were unrelated to
contacts with Ohio, the Court focused on the systematic and continu-
ous contacts of the corporation through the activities of the presi-
dent.112  Because the corporation, through the activities of its
president, “carried on in Ohio a continuous and systematic supervi-
sion of the necessarily limited wartime activities of the company,” the
Court concluded that the exercise of general personal jurisdiction over
the corporation was appropriate.113
104. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 448.
105. Perkins, 95 N.E.2d at 8.  The corporation’s funds were moved from California to
Ohio where they were held by the president in his own name. Id. The president
paid himself a salary of $12,000 for the year 1945 from the corporate funds that
he controlled. Id. at 7.
106. Id.  While some directors’ meetings were held in Ohio during the war, most were
held in locations in the United States outside of Ohio. Id. (noting meetings in
Ohio, Washington, New York, and San Francisco).
107. Id. at 6–8.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 98 N.E.2d 33 (Ohio 1951).
112. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 448 (1952).
113. Id. Ohio law requires the state supreme court’s syllabus to state the law applica-
ble to the case. Id.  The Ohio Supreme Court’s syllabus, unlike the accompanying
opinion, did not identify the Due Process Clause as the ground for the refusal to
accept jurisdiction. Perkins, 98 N.E.2d at 34, vacated, 342 U.S. 437.  Chief Jus-
tice Vinson joined Justice Minton’s dissent. Id. at 449 (Minton, J., dissenting).
These two dissenting Justices concluded that the syllabus left an adequate state
law basis for the decision below. Id. at 449–50.
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B. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall
Following Perkins, state courts began to exercise general jurisdic-
tion over nonresident corporations with “continuous and systematic”
business contacts in the state.  In Hall v. Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A., the Supreme Court of Texas found that a Colombian
corporation providing helicopter transportation services in Peru had
“continuous and systematic” business contacts with Texas based on its
purchases in Texas.  The court found these purchases supported the
state’s exercise of general jurisdiction over the corporation, notwith-
standing the fact that the claims were completely unrelated to the Co-
lombian corporation’s business contacts with Texas.114  In Hall,
decedents of the plaintiffs were killed in a helicopter accident in
Peru.115  At the time of the accident, the decedents were working for a
joint venture based in Texas.116  The joint venture had hired
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. (“Helicol”) to provide trans-
portation for its employees.117  A lawsuit related to the deaths result-
ing from the accident was brought against Helicol, the owner and
operator of the helicopter involved in the accident, but not against the
Texas employer.118
While the Texas Supreme Court held that Helicol’s contacts with
the state of Texas were sufficient to support the Texas court’s exercise
of jurisdiction, this decision was reached over strong objections from
other members of the Court.119  The dissent presaged, in many ways,
the holding years later by the Supreme Court in Goodyear and
Daimler.  Writing in dissent, Justice Pope argued that while substan-
tial and continuous activity with the state could form the basis for the
exercise of general jurisdiction over a defendant, the exercise of juris-
diction by Texas courts in such a circumstance required “some close
substantial connection with the state approaching the relationship be-
tween the state and its own residents.”120  Further, Justice Pope as-
serted that the fairness factors identified by the Supreme Court in the
context of specific jurisdiction had no relevance for determining
whether the application of general jurisdiction was appropriate.121
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed the decision
of the Texas Supreme Court in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia
114. Hall v. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A., 638 S.W.2d 870, 873–74 (Tex.
1982), rev’d sub nom. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A., v. Hall, 466 U.S.
408 (1984).
115. Id. at 870–71.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 871.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 877 (Pope, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 882–83 (Pope, J., dissenting) (citing Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co.,
342 U.S. 437, 438, 445, 448 (1952)).
121. Id.
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S.A. v. Hall.122  In the Court’s decision, written by Justice Blackmun,
the Court described Helicol’s contacts with Texas as follows: (1) the
corporation’s chief executive officer negotiated the contract to provide
transportation services in South America with the Texas joint venture
that employed the decedents; (2) approximately eighty percent of the
corporation’s helicopters and equipment were purchased from Bell He-
licopter Company, a Texas manufacturer; (3) pilots for the corporation
went to Texas for training; (4) management and maintenance person-
nel of the corporation travelled to the Bell Helicopter factory in Texas
on several occasions; and (5) payments made to the corporation were
from funds held in a Texas bank.123
The Court noted that, other than the contacts with Texas identified
above, the corporation had very little connection with Texas.  Specifi-
cally, the Court noted that the corporation had no shareholder in
Texas, owned no property in the state, had no office in Texas, had no
records held in Texas, was not registered to do business in Texas, had
never designated an agent for service of process in the state, had not
sold or performed any helicopter services in the state, had solicited no
business in the state, had signed no contracts in Texas, and had no
employees located in Texas.124
The Court framed its analysis as an attempt to answer the ques-
tion of whether the contacts Helicol had with Texas were “the kind of
continuous and systematic general business contacts” that had sup-
ported the exercise of general jurisdiction in Perkins.125  In doing so,
first, the Court articulated the distinction between specific jurisdic-
tion—where the “ ‘relationship among the defendant, the forum, and
the litigation’ is the essential foundation” for the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over a defendant126—and general jurisdiction, which fo-
cuses on the issue of whether or not there exists “sufficient contacts
between the State and the foreign corporation” to support the exercise
of general jurisdiction.127
In reviewing Helicol’s contacts with Texas to determine whether
they were sufficient to support the exercise of general jurisdiction over
the corporation, the Court rejected the findings of the Texas Supreme
Court, holding that an occasional and temporary presence of the chief
executive officer in Texas did not rise to the required level of continu-
ous and systematic contacts.128  Likewise, the Court found irrelevant
122. 466 U.S. 408, 419 (1984).
123. Id. at 410–11.  However, the parties conceded that the claims did not arise out of
or relate to the defendant’s activities in Texas. Id. at 415.
124. Id. at 411.
125. Id. at 416.
126. Id. at 414 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)).
127. Id. (citing Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779–80 (1984)).
128. Id. at 416–17.
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for general jurisdiction analysis the fact that funds paid by Helicol
were paid from a bank located in Texas.129  Finally, the Court rejected
the assertion that Helicol’s purchase of equipment in Texas and the
regular training of its pilots in Texas constituted a sufficient level of
contacts, stating “we hold that mere purchases, even if occurring at
regular intervals, are not enough to warrant a State’s assertion of in
personam jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation in a cause of ac-
tion not related to those purchase transactions.”130
Under Helicopteros, therefore, the Court made it clear that the
level of activity or contacts in a particular forum must be relatively
substantial in order to support the exercise of general jurisdiction.131
While the Court in Helicopteros adopted the “continuous and system-
atic” analysis offered by the Court in Perkins, it also asserted that
“mere purchases” in the forum, even if they took place on a regular
basis, training in the forum, or the occasional presence of corporate
officers in the forum were not “continuous and systematic” such that
they would support the exercise of general jurisdiction.132
VI. THE DEATH OF GENERAL JURISDICTION?
A. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown
For the first time since Helicopteros, the Court addressed general
jurisdiction in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown.133
In fact, Goodyear was only the third occasion after International Shoe
in which the Court addressed general jurisdiction.134
Goodyear stemmed from a tragic bus accident outside of Paris,
France, that took the lives of two 13-year-old boys from North Caro-
lina, Julian Brown and Matthew Helms.135  The boys were riding on a
bus that overturned while traveling to Charles De Gaulle Airport.136
They sustained fatal injuries in the crash.137  After the accident, the
boys’ parents filed a wrongful death action in North Carolina state
129. Id.
130. Id. at 418.  The Court relied in part on pre-International Shoe authority that
“purchases and related trips” are not sufficient for general jurisdiction. Id. at 417
(citing Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516, 518 (1923)).
131. Id. at 413–18.
132. Id. at 416–18.
133. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2854 (2011).
134. Id. (citing Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Hall v.
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A., 466 U.S. 408 (1984)) (“In only two deci-
sions postdating International Shoe . . . has this Court considered whether an
out-of-state corporate defendant’s in-state contacts were sufficiently ‘continuous
and systematic’ to justify the exercise of general jurisdiction over claims unre-
lated to those contacts . . . .”).
135. Id. at 2851.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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court in their capacity as administrators of the boys’ estates.138  The
parents alleged that a defective tire manufactured by Goodyear Tur-
key caused the accident.139
The parents sued Goodyear USA, Goodyear Luxembourg Tires, SA
(“Goodyear Luxembourg”), Goodyear Lastikleri T.A.S. (“Goodyear
Turkey”), and Goodyear Dunlop Tires France, SA (“Goodyear
France”).140  Goodyear Luxembourg, Goodyear Turkey, and Goodyear
France (“the subsidiaries”) were indirect subsidiaries of Goodyear
USA, an Ohio corporation.141  The subsidiaries manufactured tires
primarily for sale in Europe and Asia.142
According to the Court, the subsidiaries had essentially no pres-
ence in North Carolina.143  They had no place of business, employees,
or bank accounts in North Carolina.144  They did not advertise in
North Carolina.145  They did not solicit business in North Carolina or
sell or ship tires to North Carolina.146  They were also not registered
to do business in North Carolina.147  The Court did concede that a
small percentage of the subsidiaries’ tires had made their way into
North Carolina.148  However, nothing indicated that the subsidiaries
“took any affirmative action to cause tires which they had manufac-
tured to be shipped into North Carolina.”149  Moreover, the type of tire
involved in the accident was never distributed in North Carolina.150
The subsidiaries moved to dismiss the parents’ claims for lack of
personal jurisdiction.151  The trial court denied the subsidiaries’ mo-
tion, but they appealed.152  The North Carolina Court of Appeals rec-
ognized that North Carolina courts did not have specific personal
jurisdiction over the defendants.153  Because specific jurisdiction
hinges on an “affiliatio[n] between the forum and the underlying con-
troversy . . .”, [it is] “confined to adjudication of ‘issues deriving from,
138. Id.
139. Id. at 2850–51.
140. Id. at 2851–52.
141. Id. at 2852.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. (As noted by the Court, “a small percentage of petitioners’ tires (tens of
thousands out of tens of millions manufactured between 2004 and 2007) were
distributed within North Carolina by other Goodyear USA affiliates.”)
149. Id. (quoting Brown v. Meter, 681 S.E.2d 382, 392 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009)).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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or connected with, the very controversy that establishes
jurisdiction.’”154
In this case, the controversy did not arise out of or relate to the
subsidiaries’ activities in North Carolina.155  The bus accident oc-
curred in France, and Goodyear Turkey manufactured and sold the
allegedly defective tire abroad.156  Therefore, the North Carolina
Court of Appeals instead focused on whether North Carolina courts
could exercise general personal jurisdiction over the subsidiaries and
looked to whether the subsidiaries had “continuous and systematic
contacts” with North Carolina.157
The North Carolina Court of Appeals ultimately found that the
subsidiaries had continuous and systematic contacts with North Caro-
lina because they placed their tires in the stream of commerce without
geographical limitation.158  The North Carolina Court of Appeals be-
lieved that the subsidiaries’ tires could be and were sold in the United
States and North Carolina.159  The court noted that the kind of tire
involved in the accident was marked for sale in the United States,
which further led the court to determine that “the [subsidiaries] con-
templated that the tire might be sold in the United States.”160  Moreo-
ver, the court found that the subsidiaries’ tires reached North
Carolina through a “highly-organized distribution process” with other
Goodyear USA subsidiaries—not just through a random, one-time
occurrence.161
The North Carolina Court of Appeals also addressed the issue of
fairness, as related to the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the
subsidiaries.162  It asserted that North Carolina’s “interest in provid-
154. Id. at 2851 (quoting von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Sug-
gested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966)).
155. Id. at 2852, 2855.
156. Id. at 2855 (“As the North Carolina Court of Appeals recognized . . . both the act
alleged to have caused injury (the fabrication of the allegedly defective tire) and
its impact (the accident) occurred outside [North Carolina].”).
157. Id.
158. Id. (quoting Brown v. Meter, 681 S.E.2d 382, 394 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009)).
159. Id.
160. Hoffheimer, supra note 99, at 571 (quoting Brown, 681 S.E.2d at 393); Goodyear,
131 S. Ct. at 2852.
161. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2852 (quoting Brown, 681 S.E. 2d at 393–94); see also
Hoffheimer, supra note 99, at 571 (noting that the state of North Carolina im-
ported “at least 33,923 tires manufactured by Goodyear France, 6,402 tires man-
ufactured by Goodyear Luxembourg, and 4,059 tires manufactured by Goodyear
Turkey” between the years of 2004 and 2007, inducing the court to find the sub-
sidiaries accountable of fostering a global business presence (citing Brown, 681
S.E.2d at 394)).
162. This is contrary to the Supreme Court’s view that “fairness factors” or questions
of reasonableness are not a part of general jurisdiction analysis.  Monestier,
supra note 10, at 263 (citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 762 n.20
(2014)) (stating that “The Court, on the other hand, is of the view that the reason-
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ing a forum in which its citizens are able to seek redress for [their]
injuries,” combined with the hardship the parents would experience if
required to litigate their claims in France, further supported the trial
court’s exercise of general personal jurisdiction.163  The North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals thus affirmed the trial court’s exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction over the subsidiaries.164  The subsidiaries sought
appeal.  After the North Carolina Supreme Court denied discretionary
review, the subsidiaries moved on to the U.S. Supreme Court.165
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and ultimately reversed the
North Carolina Court of Appeals.166  Justice Ginsburg authored the
unanimous opinion of the court.  She described the question presented
as: “Are foreign subsidiaries of a United States parent corporation
amendable to suit in state court on claims unrelated to any activity or
subsidiaries in the forum State?”167
The Court began its analysis by addressing the limits that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment places on a state court’s
authority to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign defendant.168  The
Court drew a clear distinction between the two categories of personal
jurisdiction that developed from the analysis of International Shoe,
namely specific personal jurisdiction and general personal jurisdic-
tion.169  It noted that unlike specific personal jurisdiction, general
personal jurisdiction arises in “instances in which the continuous cor-
porate operations within a state [are] so substantial and of such a na-
ture as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from
dealings entirely distinct from those activities.”170  According to the
Court, a state may exercise general jurisdiction over foreign corpora-
tions “when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and
systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum
State.”171
ableness test applies only to assertions of specific jurisdiction, not to assertions of
general jurisdiction. This is because the nature of general jurisdiction is such
that it is de facto fair and reasonable to require a defendant to answer to suit in
that particular forum.”); see also Freer, supra note 11, at 6 (explaining that a
court’s inability to consider equality measures puts prosecuting parties in a diffi-
cult spot, whereby courts have no ability to take under consideration either the
plaintiff or the state’s interests).
163. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853 (quoting Brown, 681 S.E.2d at 394).
164. Id. at 2852.
165. See id. at 2853 (citing Brown v. Meter, 695 S.E.2d 756 (N.C. 2010)).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 2850.
168. Id. at 2853.
169. Id. at 2853–54.
170. Id. at 2849, 2853 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945)).
171. Id. at 2851 (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317).
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The North Carolina Court of Appeals recognized that Goodyear
was a general jurisdiction case, and the Court agreed.172  But accord-
ing to the Court, the North Carolina Court of Appeals “elided the es-
sential difference between” specific and general jurisdiction.173
Specifically, the Supreme Court disagreed with the analysis of the
North Carolina Court of Appeals that focused on the stream of com-
merce through which the subsidiaries’ products moved into North Car-
olina as its basis for finding that general jurisdiction was appropriate
in that circumstance.174  The Court noted a “[f]low of a manufacturer’s
products into the forum . . . may bolster an affiliation germane to spe-
cific jurisdiction,” not general jurisdiction.175  Indeed, the Court noted
that “ties serving to bolster the exercise of specific jurisdiction do not
warrant a determination that, based on those ties, the forum has gen-
eral jurisdiction over a defendant.”176
The Court in Goodyear did not expressly limit general jurisdiction
to a corporation’s state of incorporation or its principal place of busi-
ness.177  Instead, it relied on Helicopteros to reach its decision.
Helicopteros held that “mere purchases [made in the forum State],
even if occurring at regular intervals, are not enough to warrant a
State’s assertion of [general] jurisdiction over a nonresident corpora-
tion in a cause of action not related to those purchase transactions.”178
In light of the holding in Helicopteros, the Court treated Goodyear
as an easy decision.  The Court found that the subsidiaries’ “sporadic”
sale of tires in North Carolina through intermediaries was not mark-
172. Id. at 2851 (“Because the episode-in-suit, the bus accident, occurred in France,
and the tire alleged to have caused the accident was manufactured and sold
abroad, North Carolina courts lacked specific jurisdiction to adjudicate the con-
troversy.  The North Carolina Court of Appeals so acknowledged.” (citing Brown
v. Meter, 681 S.E.2d 382, 388 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009))).
173. Id. at 2949, 2855.
174. Id.
175. Id. (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
176. Id. at 2855–56 (citing Stabilisierungsfonds Fur Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Dis-
tribs. Pty. Ltd., 647 F.2d 200, 203 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
177. See id. at 2853–54 (“For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of
general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a corporation, it is an
equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home.”); see
also Hoffheimer, supra note 99, at 574 (stating that “Justice Ginsburg did not
limit general jurisdiction to a corporation’s place of incorporation or principal
place of business.”).  The Court, however, did cite authority describing these as
the paradigm examples of jurisdictions where defendant-corporations are subject
to general jurisdiction. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851 (citing Leo Brilmayer et al.,
A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEXAS L. REV. 721, 728 (1988)).
178. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856 (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom. S.A. v.
Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418 (1984)); see also Hoffheimer, supra note 99, at 574 (noting
that Goodyear’s significant tire sales in the state of North Carolina were insuffi-
cient to convince the Court that Goodyear had reasonably “systematic or continu-
ous” contacts with the state—adequate enough in which to categorize Goodyear
as being “at home” in North Carolina).
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edly different from the Helicopteros defendant’s insufficient ties to
Texas.179  Whether the subsidiaries’ tires made their way through a
well-defined distribution channel was not a relevant question for a de-
termination of general jurisdiction, in that “a corporation’s ‘continuous
activity of some sorts within a state’” is simply “not enough to support
the demand that the corporation be amenable to suits unrelated to
that activity.”180  Unlike the defendant in Perkins, the subsidiaries
were in “no sense at home in North Carolina.”181  Ultimately, the
Court held that the subsidiaries’ “attenuated” connections to North
Carolina were “far short of the . . . ‘the continuous and systematic gen-
eral business contacts’ necessary to empower North Carolina to enter-
tain suit against them on claims unrelated to anything that connects
them to the State.”182
B. Daimler AG v. Bauman
The Goodyear opinion illustrated how courts should apply general
jurisdiction in relation to specific jurisdiction.183  In Daimler, the
Court solidified its holding in Goodyear, namely that a court may exer-
cise general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation only when the cor-
poration’s “affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and
systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.”184
In doing so, however, the Court fundamentally changed the doctrine of
general jurisdiction.
Daimler, like Goodyear, involved a unique set of facts.  The case
arose out of Argentina’s “Dirty War”—a period between 1976 and
1983 in which military dictatorship ruled Argentina.185  In 2004, the
plaintiffs (respondents in the Supreme Court) filed suit against
Daimler AG in the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California.186  Daimler is a German public stock company that
manufactures Mercedes-Benz vehicles in Germany.187  The plaintiffs
alleged that during Argentina’s dirty war, Mercedes-Benz Argentina
(“MB Argentina”)—a wholly owned subsidiary of Daimler’s predeces-
179. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856 (“We see no reason to differentiate from the ties to
Texas held insufficient in Helicopteros, the sales of petitioners’ tires sporadically
made in North Carolina through intermediaries.”).
180. Id. 2849, 2856 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945)).
181. Id. at 2857.
182. Id. (citing Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416).
183. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 751 (2014) (“In Goodyear . . . we ad-
dressed the distinction between general or all-purpose jurisdiction, and specific or
conduct-linked jurisdiction.”); Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2854 (“[S]pecific jurisdic-
tion has become the centerpiece of modern jurisdiction theory, while general ju-
risdiction plays a reduced role”).
184. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 751 (2014) (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 2851).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 752.
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sor in interest—“collaborated with Argentinian state security forces to
kidnap, detain, torture, and kill plaintiffs and their relatives.”188
The plaintiffs asserted that MB Argentina had colluded with the
Argentinian government by allowing military and police officers sta-
tioned inside the plant to determine which employees were “subver-
sive.”189  As a result of this action, the plaintiffs alleged that the
government determined that each plaintiff was a “subversive,” leading
to the kidnapping and torture, murder, or exile of the plaintiffs.190  At
the time of these events, MB Argentina was a wholly owned subsidi-
ary of Daimler’s predecessor in interest.191  Plaintiffs sought to hold
Daimler liable for MB Argentina’s alleged wrongful conduct.192  How-
ever, all of MB Argentina’s alleged wrongdoing took place in Argen-
tina; the plaintiffs never alleged that MB Argentina did anything in
California or anywhere else in the United States.193
Daimler moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction.194  The plaintiffs conceded that California courts
did not have specific personal jurisdiction over Daimler—the plain-
tiffs’ claims did not arise out of or relate to Daimler’s alleged activity
in California.195  Instead, the plaintiffs argued that Daimler’s contacts
with California were extensive enough to subject it to the general per-
sonal jurisdiction of California courts.196  In turn, they submitted evi-
dence and tried to demonstrate Daimler’s presence in California.197
Plaintiffs contended alternatively that the District Court could exer-
cise jurisdiction over Daimler through the California contacts of its
indirect subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz USA (“MBUSA”).198
MBUSA was Daimler’s exclusive importer and distributor in the
United States.199  MBUSA purchased Mercedes cars from Daimler in
Germany.200  It then imported the cars and distributed them to inde-
pendent dealers located throughout the United States.201  MBUSA, a
188. Id. at 751–52.
189. First Amended Complaint for Damages and Declaratory Relief at 10, Bauman v.
DaimlerChrysler AG, No. C-04-00194 RMW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31929 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 22, 2005).
190. Id. at 11–14.
191. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 752.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 758; Daimler AG v. Bauman, 128 HARV. L. REV. 311 (Nov. 10, 2014), http://
harvardlawreview.org/2014/11/daimler-ag-v-bauman/ [https://perma.unl.edu/
P755-7PNA].
196. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 752.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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Delaware LLC, had its principle place of business in New Jersey, but
it also had numerous facilities in California.202  Additionally, MBUSA
was California’s largest supplier of luxury vehicles.203
The District Court granted Daimler’s motion to dismiss after al-
lowing jurisdictional discovery on the plaintiffs’ agency allegations.204
First, the District Court determined that Daimler did not have enough
contact with California to support the court’s exercise of general per-
sonal jurisdiction over it.205  The court then found that the plaintiffs
failed to demonstrate that MBUSA acted as Daimler’s agent, and thus
it refused to impute MBUSA’s contacts with California to Daimler.206
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit initially affirmed the District Court’s
ruling with one judge dissenting.207  The Ninth Circuit addressed the
agency question alone and held that the plaintiffs had failed to demon-
strate a relationship that would allow MBUSA’s California contacts to
be imputed to Daimler.208  The court concluded that “[b]ecause there
[was] insufficient control and because MBUSA does not serve as
[Daimler]’s representative, the contacts of MBUSA cannot be
imputed.”209
The Ninth Circuit, however, granted the plaintiffs’ petition for re-
hearing and changed its ruling.210  A three-judge panel heard the case
and reversed the district court’s decision granting Daimler’s motion to
dismiss.211  On rehearing, the court determined that the agency test
was satisfied, such that the exercise of jurisdiction over Daimler
would be reasonable.212  The court concluded that MBUSA was indeed
Daimler’s agent because the services performed by MBUSA were nec-
essary for Daimler’s operation and that the General Distributor
Agreement that governed the relationship between Daimler and
202. MBUSA maintained a regional office in Costa Mesa, California, a Vehicle Prepa-
ration Center in Carson, and a Classic Center in Irvine. Id.
203. Id. (“[O]ver 10% of all sales of new vehicles in the United States take place in
California, and MBUSA’s California sales account for 2.4% of Daimler’s world-
wide sales.”).
204. Id.
205. Id. (citing Application to Petition for Certiorari at 111a–112a, Bauman v.
DaimlerChrysler AG, No. C-04-00194 RMW, 2005 WL 3157472, at *9–*10. (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 22, 2005)).
206. Id. at 752–53 (citing Application to Petition for Certiorari at 117a, 133a,
Bauman, 2005 WL 3157472, at *12, *19; Application to Petition for Certiorari at
83a–85a, Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler AG, No. C-04-00194 RMW), 2007 WL
486389, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2007).
207. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 753.
208. Id. (citing Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 579 F.3d 1088, 1096–97 (9th Cir.
2009)).
209. Bauman, 579 F.3d at 1097.
210. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 753 (citing Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d
909 (9th Cir. 2011)).
211. See Bauman, 644 F.3d 909.
212. Id. at 921–30.
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MBUSA demonstrated the intent that Daimler “has the right to con-
trol nearly all aspects of MBUSA’s operations.”213  The court deter-
mined that it was reasonable for California to exercise jurisdiction
over Daimler, because it comported “with fair play and substantial
justice,” in that Daimler “has purposefully and extensively interjected
itself into the California market through MBUSA.”214  Daimler peti-
tioned the court for rehearing en banc, but the Ninth Circuit denied
the petition over the dissent of eight judges.215
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and ultimately reversed the
Ninth Circuit’s ruling.216  Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of
the Court.  In the first sentence of the Court’s opinion, she stated that
Daimler “concern[ed] the authority of a court in the United States to
entertain a claim brought by foreign plaintiffs against a foreign defen-
dant based on events occurring entirely outside the United States.”217
The Ninth Circuit and the parties alike had focused on the agency
question—whether MBUSA’s California contacts could be imputed to
Daimler.218  Moreover, a split of authority existed about the Circuit
Courts of Appeals on whether and when courts could attribute a sub-
sidiary corporation’s contacts to a corporate parent.219  Essentially,
Daimler argued that the Ninth Circuit’s analysis was not sufficiently
rigorous.220  Justice Ginsburg, however, did not base her decision on
agency; she resolved the issue on her own terms.221  Indeed, she as-
213. Id. at 921–24.  As the court noted, under the General Distributor Agreement,
MBUSA was bound to comply with all requirements established by Daimler and
was required to notify Daimler of its actions, “including personnel changes, cus-
tomer information, and marketing strategy.” Id. at 924.
214. Id. at 925, 929–30.
215. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 751 (citing Bauman v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 676 F.3d
774 (9th Cir. 2011)).
216. Id. at 751, 753.
217. Id. at 750.
218. See id. at 753, 758; see also William Baude, Opinion Recap: A Stricter View of
General Jurisdiction, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 15, 2014, 11:30 AM), http://www
.scotusblog.com/2014/01/opinion-recap-a-stricter-view-of-general-jurisdiction/
 [https://perma.unl.edu/DK9K-4SQ7] (summarizing the Supreme Court’s decision
in Daimler Chrysler v. Bauman).
219. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 759 (“Daimler argues, and several Courts of Appeals
have held, that a subsidiary’s jurisdictional contacts can be imputed to its parent
only when the former is so dominated by the latter as to be its alter ego.  The
Ninth Circuit adopted a less rigorous test based on what it described as an
‘agency’ relationship.”); see also Baude, supra note 218 (acknowledging the cir-
cuits are in disagreement over when conduct can be credited to a parent
corporation).
220. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 759; see also Baude, supra note 218 (stating Daimler
argued the Ninth Circuit “made it too easy to attribute one corporation’s behavior
to another.”).
221. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760; see also Baude, supra note 218 (noting the Court
held it did not matter whether one corporation’s behavior was attributed to
another).
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sumed that California courts had general jurisdiction over MBUSA
and that MBUSA’s California contacts were attributable to
Daimler.222  Even so, she found that Daimler was not subject to gen-
eral jurisdiction in California because its “slim contacts” with Califor-
nia “hardly render[ed] it at home there.”223
But why?  The Court framed the issue in Daimler as whether, con-
sistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a
California court could exercise jurisdiction over Daimler for claims in-
volving only foreign plaintiffs and conduct occurring entirely
abroad.224  Justice Ginsburg began her opinion with a lengthy discus-
sion of the Court’s specific and general personal jurisdiction prece-
dent.225  Similar to her opinion in Goodyear, she set the playing field
by noting the marked differences between specific jurisdiction and
general jurisdiction.226  Perhaps most importantly, based on Justice
Ginsburg’s opinion, it appears that the traditional understanding of
general jurisdiction has fallen out of favor with the Court.  Justice
Ginsburg noted that specific jurisdiction is the “centerpiece of modern
jurisdiction theory[,]” while “[g]eneral jurisdiction has come to occupy
a less dominant place . . . .”227
With the parameters of the analysis established, Justice Ginsburg
then turned to the issue at hand.  She took care to make it clear that
“Goodyear did not hold that a corporation may be subject to general
jurisdiction only in a forum where it is incorporated or has its princi-
pal place of business; it simply typed those places paradigm all-pur-
pose forums.”228  But Justice Ginsburg characterized the plaintiffs’
argument that courts may exercise general jurisdiction in every state
in which a corporation engages in a “substantial, continuous, and sys-
tematic course of business” as “unacceptably grasping.”229  She re-
peated again that the proper inquiry under Goodyear is whether a
corporation’s “affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and sys-
tematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.”230  In
a footnote in Daimler, however, Justice Ginsburg recognized a wholly
new factor in general personal jurisdiction analysis.231  One must now
222. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 753.
225. Id. at 753–58.
226. Id. at 754–58.  Specific jurisdiction is implicated where the cause of action arises
out of or is related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.  Meanwhile, gen-
eral jurisdiction allows defendants to be sued on claims that are “entirely dis-
tinct” from their activities in the forum. Id. at 749.
227. Id. at 755, 758.
228. Id. at 760.
229. Id. at 760–61.
230. Id. at 761 (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct.
2846, 2851 (2011)).
231. Id. at 762 n.20.
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look not only to a corporation’s activities in the forum, because
“[g]eneral jurisdiction instead calls for an appraisal of a corporation’s
activities in their entirety, nationwide and worldwide.”232  According
to Justice Ginsburg, however, “[a] corporation that operates in many
places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.”233
In Daimler, neither Daimler nor MBUSA was incorporated or had
their principal place of business in California.234  Likewise, Justice
Ginsburg noted that “[i]f Daimler’s California activities sufficed to al-
low adjudication of this Argentina-rooted case in California, the same
global reach would presumably be available in every other State in
which MBUSA’s sales [were] sizeable.”235  Justice Ginsburg classified
such an exercise of general jurisdiction “exorbitant” because it would
not allow out-state defendants to predict where they will be sued.236
Meanwhile, a corporation’s place of incorporation and principle place
of business, as they each are usually only one place, are easily ascer-
tainable.237  Both of those bases “afford plaintiffs recourse to at least
one clear and certain forum in which a corporate defendant may be
sued on any and all claims.”238  Thus, while Justice Ginsburg main-
tained that Goodyear did not limit general jurisdiction to a corpora-
tion’s place of incorporation and principle place of business, the Court
in Daimler held that general jurisdiction would be limited to those two
places in all but “exceptional” cases—the Court cited Perkins as an
example of such a case.239
Finally, Justice Ginsburg turned to the transnational aspect of the
dispute in Daimler.  The Ninth Circuit believed that the plaintiffs’
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 761.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 761–62.
237. Id. at 760.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 761 n.19 (“We do not foreclose the possibility that in an exceptional
case . . . a corporation’s operations in a forum other than its formal place of incor-
poration or principal place of business may be so substantial and of such a nature
as to render the corporation at home in that State.”) (citing Perkins v. Benguet
Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952)).  Professors Hoffheimer and Cornett
have identified five situations that might present “exceptional cases,” writing
that these are “five situations that remain viable candidates for general jurisdic-
tion, either because the level of the defendant’s in-state activity establishes a
principal place of business in the state or because a corporation’s activity makes
the corporation ‘at home’ in the state.”  Michael H. Hoffheimer & Judy M.
Cornett, Good-Bye Significant Contacts: General Personal Jurisdiction After
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 101, 151 (2015).  These five situations
are:
1. Foreign Corporation Conducting All or Most of Its Business in the Forum
State
2. Foreign National Corporation Engaging in Most of Its U.S. Business in One
State
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claims under the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection
Act of 1991 supported the exercise of general jurisdiction.240  The
Court fundamentally disagreed with this conclusion.241  According to
Justice Ginsburg, the Ninth Circuit failed to consider “the risks to in-
ternational comity its expansive view of jurisdiction posed.”242
In concurrence, Justice Sotomayor agreed with the Court that, in
light of the unique circumstances of the case, the Due Process Clause
prohibited a California court from exercising personal jurisdiction
over Daimler.243  However, she disagreed with how the Court reached
its conclusion.244  Most notably, she characterized the proportionality
approach adopted by Justice Ginsburg in footnote 20 of the Court’s
opinion as “wholly foreign to the [Court’s] due process jurispru-
dence.”245  Moreover, she maintained that the Court’s focus on
Daimler’s out-of-state contacts was inexplicably inconsistent with the
Court’s previous personal jurisdiction decisions.246
For Justice Sotomayor, California’s exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion in this situation would be unreasonable.247  She conceded that
the Court had never decided whether the “reasonableness” prong of
personal jurisdiction analysis should apply in general jurisdiction
cases.248  In this case, however, Daimler had never argued against the
Court’s application of the reasonableness prong and had conceded that
the inquiry was appropriate.249  Therefore, according to Justice
Sotomayor, the Court could conduct a reasonableness inquiry in this
case without deciding whether such an inquiry would be proper in all
general jurisdiction cases.250
3. Foreign Corporation Conducting All or Most of Its Business Activity in the
United States but Maintaining No Principal Place of Business or Place of
Incorporation in Any State
4. Corporation with an Outsized Presence in the State
5. Corporations Maintaining a Permanent Physical Presence in the State By
Operating Factories, Mines, or Other Non-Sales Related Activities
Id. at 151–55.
240. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762.
241. Id. at 763 (noting that “[c]onsiderations of international rapport . . . reinforce [the
Court’s] determination that subjecting Daimler to the general jurisdiction of
courts in California would not accord with the ‘fair play and substantial justice’
due process demands.”).
242. Id.
243. Id. at 763–73 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 764.
246. Id. at 764, 767 (stating that “[i]n every case where we have applied [International
Shoe], we have focused solely on the magnitude of the defendant’s in-state con-
tacts, not the relative magnitude of those contacts in comparison to the defen-
dant’s contacts with other States.”).
247. Id. at 765.
248. Id. at 764.
249. Id. at 765.
250. Id.
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VII. REGISTRATION AND GENERAL PERSONAL
JURISDICTION
A. Introduction
Through Goodyear and Daimler, the Court has radically trans-
formed the traditional understanding of general jurisdiction.  For gen-
erations, scholars and courts did not question that continuous and
systematic contacts sufficed for the exercise of general jurisdiction.
Goodyear and Daimler together make clear that general jurisdiction
exists where a “corporation’s affiliations with the State in which suit
is brought are so constant and pervasive ‘as to render [it] essentially
at home in the forum State.’”251
According to the Court, “[s]imple jurisdictional rules . . . promote
greater predictability.  Predictability is valuable to corporations mak-
ing business and investment decisions.”252  Thus, the primary goal of
the standard adopted by the Court in Daimler was to have a jurisdic-
tional analysis that was both predictable and certain.  By focusing on
principal place of business and state of incorporation as the paradig-
matic bases for general jurisdiction, the Court injected a far more cat-
egorical and restrictive approach to general jurisdiction than seen in
any of its prior jurisprudence.253
Before Daimler, the Court had never limited general jurisdiction to
a strict categorical approach, although state of incorporation and prin-
cipal place of business have long been seen as the primary models of
general jurisdiction.254  Yet, even though Daimler presented the Court
with the opportunity to strictly limit general jurisdiction to state of
incorporation and principal place of business, the Court declined that
opportunity.  While not really defining what the surviving basis for
general jurisdiction would be, the Court looked to Perkins as the type
of unique situation where a corporation’s contacts with the forum are
“so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at
home.”255
However, in addition to this third undefined category of “at home”
general jurisdiction, is the continuing question of whether the exercise
of personal jurisdiction over a corporation who has registered to do
business in a state, who has appointed an agent to receive service of
process in the state, and who has been served within the state as a
result of registration is proper.  Some scholars have noted that with
251. Id. at 751 (majority opinion).
252. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010).
253. Twitchell, supra note 9, at 669–70 (noting that principal place of business, or the
company’s headquarters, is equivalent to an individual’s domicile, and that the
state of incorporation provides an additional “uniform home base”).
254. Id.
255. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 n.19 (2014).
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the narrowing of the traditional understanding of general jurisdiction
as a result of the decision in Daimler, “the natural next step for plain-
tiffs is to seek other grounds for general jurisdiction, and the most
obvious place to look . . . is in a state registration filing that designates
a corporate agent for service of process.”256
Nearly all states have registration statutes requiring corporations
that do business in the state register with the state and appoint an
agent for service of process.257  What are the purposes of such stat-
256. Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Toward a New Equi-
librium in Personal Jurisdiction, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 207, 259–60 (2014); ac-
cord Monestier, supra note 10, at 279–82.  While Professor Monestier agrees on
this particular point, she has strongly argued that corporate registration cannot
be a valid basis for the exercise of general jurisdiction after Daimler, contrary to
the position asserted in this Article. See generally Tanya J. Monestier, Registra-
tion Statutes, General Jurisdiction, and the Fallacy of Consent, 36 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1358 (2014).  Justice Ginsburg had previously indicated some curiosity re-
garding whether registration could serve as a basis for the exercise of general
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation.  During oral argument in Goodyear, the
following exchange occurred between Justice Ginsburg and counsel for the
United States:
JUSTICE GINSBURG: Well, suppose it’s just a corporation that’s regis-
tered to do business in North Carolina, and the [sic] connection with that
registration — it says: I appoint so-and-so my agent to receive process
for any and all claims.
MR. HORWICH: Well, . . . there is a division in the lower courts on
whether that sort of a consent is effective to permit the State general
jurisdiction over — over the consenting party.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 15:16–25, Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,
S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011) (No. 10-76), https://www.supremecourt.gov/
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/10-76.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/W27B-
NB7Z].
257. See, e.g., Monestier, supra note 256, at 1358–1400; Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes,
Nineteenth Century Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine in a Twenty-First Century
World, 64 FLA. L. REV. 387, 436 (2012); Mark Schuck, Comment, Foreign Corpo-
rations and the Issue of Consent to Jurisdiction Through Registration to Do Busi-
ness in Texas: Analysis and Proposal, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1455, 1482 (2004)
(referring to these statutes as “registration and appointment” statutes); Conna
Bond, Note, Florida’s Corporate Qualification Statute: Implications for Foreign
Lenders, 49 FLA. L. REV. 139 (1997) (referring to these statutes as “qualification”
statutes); and Note, The Legal Consequences of Failure to Comply with Domesti-
cation Statutes, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 241 (1961) (referring to these statutes as “do-
mestication” statutes).  The relevant state registration statutes are: ALA. CODE
§ 10A-1-7.01 (2010); ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.705 (2014); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-
1501(A) (2013); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-1501(a) (2001); CAL. CORP. CODE § 2105(a)
(West 2014); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-90-801(1) (2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-
920(a) (West 2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 371(b) (2011); D.C. CODE § 29-
105.02(a) (2013); FLA. STAT. § 607.1501(1) (West 2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-
1501(a) (2003); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 414-431(a) (LexisNexis 2008); 805 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13.05 (West 2010); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-49-1(a) (West
2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490.1501(1) (West 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7931(a)
(2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14A.9-010(1) (West 2010); LA. STAT. ANN. § 12:301
(2010); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-C, § 1501(1) (2005); MD. CODE ANN., Corps &
2016]REGISTRATION, FAIRNESS, GENERAL JURISDICTION 509
utes?  Generally, such statutes allow the state to protect its sover-
eignty by creating a mechanism to hold foreign corporations
accountable when they do business within the state.258  In analyzing
the jurisdictional impact of registration statutes, courts tend to take
one of three basic approaches:
(1) corporate registration provides a basis for the exercise of general jurisdic-
tion over a defendant;
(2) corporate registration provides a basis for the exercise of specific jurisdic-
tion over a defendant related to its in-state business activities; or
(3) corporate registration provides a mechanism for effecting service of pro-
cess over a defendant but provides no independent basis for the exercise of
personal jurisdiction.259
Ass’ns § 7-203(a) (West 2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156D, § 15.01(a) (West
2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.2011 (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 303.03 (West 2011); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-15.01(a) (2013); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 351.572(1) (West 2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-1026(1) (2015); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 21-20, 168(1) (Reissue 2012), repealed by NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2,203(a)
(Cum. Supp. 2015); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 80.010(1) (LexisNexis 2010); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:15.01(a) (2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:13-3(1) (West
2003); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-17-1 (2015); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1301(a) (McKin-
ney 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-15-01(a) (2013); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 10-19.1-
134 (West 2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1703.03 (West 2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 1130(B) (West 2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.701(1) (2013); 15 PA. STAT. AND
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4121(a) (West 2013), repealed by 15 PA. STAT. AND CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 20302 (2013); 7 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.2-1401(a) (1999); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 33-15-101(a) (2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-1A-1501 (2007); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 48-25-101(a) (2012); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 9.001 (West 2012);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-1501(1) (LexisNexis 2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A,
§ 15.01(a) (2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-757(A) (2011); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 23B.15.010(1) (2015); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 31D-15-1501(a) (West 2012); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 180.1501(1) (West 2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-1501(a) (2013).
258. See generally Monestier, supra note 256, at 1358–71; Lee Scott Taylor, Note, Re-
gistration Statutes, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Problem of Predictability, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1164 (2003) (“Certainly, the increasing complexity of legal
relationships makes clear the need for states to develop some regime of regula-
tory jurisdiction in order to ensure domestic accountability, and so renders regis-
tration or ‘qualification’ statutes generally unexceptionable.”).
259. Monestier, supra note 256, at 1369.  As Professor Tanya Monestier has written in
arguing that after Daimler, registration is not a valid basis for the exercise of
general jurisdiction:
For those courts that subscribe to the view that corporate registration
amounts to general jurisdiction, the reasoning usually focuses on the is-
sue of consent—that by registering to do business pursuant to the state
registration statute, a corporation has expressly consented to jurisdic-
tion. Since consent is an independent basis for jurisdiction, separate and
apart from minimum contacts, no additional due process analysis is nec-
essary. The corporation’s consent, in itself, satisfies due process.
Other courts hold that a corporation’s act of registering to do business
amounts to its consent to jurisdiction for causes of action arising from
the business that it actually conducts in the state.  In effect, these courts
view the act of registration as a form of consent to specific (rather than
general) jurisdiction.  Under this view, the consent would essentially be
co-extensive with the minimum contacts standard for jurisdiction.
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Courts not only are divided as to whether registration provides a
basis for the exercise of general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation,
but even where courts have concluded that registration does provide
such a basis, a split remains as to why registration is a basis for the
exercise of general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation.260  As Pro-
fessor Monestier points out, courts have articulated three rationales to
support the position that registration provides a basis for the exercise
of general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation:
The overwhelming majority of courts that view registration as conferring gen-
eral jurisdiction justify their conclusion on the basis of consent—i.e., by taking
steps to register under a state statute, the corporation has manifested its ex-
press consent to general jurisdiction.  Some courts, however, justify the asser-
tion of general jurisdiction on the basis of either “presence” or “minimum
contacts.”261
The Court has previously addressed the issue of whether registra-
tion provides a sufficient basis for the exercise of general jurisdiction
over a foreign corporation.  In Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. of
Philadelphia v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., the Court held that
a corporation had consented to personal jurisdiction within Missouri
by obtaining a license to do business in that State.262  The Court con-
cluded that by obtaining the license to do business, the corporation
had complied with a state statute requiring it to file a form indicating
that service of process on a state agency would be deemed personal
service upon the corporation.263  On the issue of whether limitations
existed as to the consent of the corporation, the Court looked to the
relevant state statute and noted that the defendant appointed a statu-
tory agent for service of process in compliance with a state statute
that could rationally reach any and all lawsuits filed against the de-
Finally, some courts do not ascribe any particular substantive jurisdic-
tional significance to the act of registering to do business or appointing
an agent for service of process.  Under this view, the appointment of an
agent is simply a way to effectuate service of process and thereby perfect
jurisdiction.  The appointment of an agent does not in any way obviate
the need to independently establish a constitutionally acceptable basis
for jurisdiction.
Id. at 1369–71 (footnotes omitted).
260. Id. at 1359. Compare Brown v. CBS Corp., 19 F. Supp. 3d 390, 393–96 (D. Conn.
2014) (rejecting registration as a basis of personal jurisdiction), and WorldCare
Ltd. Corp. v. World Ins. Co., 767 F. Supp. 2d 341, 354–57 (D. Conn. 2011) (same),
with Talenti v. Morgan & Bro. Manhattan Storage Co., Inc., 968 A.2d 933, 940–41
(Conn. App. Ct. 2009) (holding that registration in Connecticut results in a defen-
dant voluntarily consenting to personal jurisdiction, making a due process analy-
sis is unnecessary), and Wallenta v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 522 A.2d 820, 824
(Conn. App. Ct. 1987) (engaging in a due process analysis even after finding that
the defendant consented to suit by registration).
261. Monestier, supra note 256, at 1371.
262. Pa. Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93, 95–96 (1917).
263. Id.
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fendant.264  In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the argu-
ment made by the defendant that applying general personal
jurisdiction based upon registration to do business in the state, ap-
pointment of an agent to receive service in the state, and actual ser-
vice on the agent in the state violated the due process rights of the
defendant.265
In Robert Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Selden Breck Const. Co., the
Court clarified its holding in Pennsylvania Fire and explained that
federal courts should first look to how state courts have interpreted
state registration statutes to determine whether a corporation’s com-
pliance with the statute grants the court personal jurisdiction over the
corporation:
The purpose in requiring the appointment of such an agent is primarily to
secure local jurisdiction in respect of business transacted within the State. Of
course when a foreign corporation appoints one as required by statute it takes
the risk of the construction that will be put upon the statute and the scope of the
agency by the State Court. But the reasons for a limited interpretation of a
compulsory assent are hardly less strong when the assent is expressed by the
appointment of an agent than when it is implied from going into business in
the State without appointing one. . . . Unless the state law either expressly or
by local construction gives to the appointment a larger scope, we should not
construe it to extend to suits in respect of business transacted by foreign corpo-
rations elsewhere[.]266
The Supreme Court reaffirmed Pennsylvania Fire in Neirbo Co. v.
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.267 Neirbo did not address personal ju-
risdiction, but rather the issue of whether a defendant had waived the
right to contest venue in a federal court after it had complied with a
264. Id. at 95.
265. Id.  In reaching this conclusion, Justice Holmes wrote:
The construction of the Missouri statute thus adopted hardly leaves a
constitutional question open.  The defendant had executed a power of
attorney that made service on the superintendent the equivalent of per-
sonal service.  If by a corporate vote it had accepted service in this spe-
cific case, there would be no doubt of the jurisdiction of the state court
over a transitory action of contract.  If it had appointed an agent author-
ized in terms to receive service in such cases, there would be equally
little doubt.  New York, L. E. & W. R. Co. v. Estill, 147 U. S. 591, 37 L.
ed. 292, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 444.  It did appoint an agent in language that
rationally might be held to go to that length.  The language has been
held to go to that length, and the construction did not deprive the defen-
dant of due process of law even if it took the defendant by surprise,
which we have no warrant to assert.  O’Neil v. Northern Colorado Irrig.
Co., 242 U. S. 20, 26, 61 L. ed. 123, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 7.  Other state laws
have been construed in a similar way; e. g., Bagdon v. Philadelphia & R.
Coal & I. Co., 217 N. Y. 432, L.R.A.1916F, 407, 111 N. E. 1075; Johnston
v. Trade Ins. Co., 132 Mass. 432.
Id.
266. Robert Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Selden Breck Const. Co., 257 U.S. 213, 215–16
(emphasis added) (citing Pa. Fire Ins. Co., 243 US. at 93).
267. 308 U.S. 165 (1939).
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state statute and appointed an agent for service.268  Nonetheless, the
Neirbo Court cited Pennsylvania Fire and noted that by complying
with the statute, the defendant had committed a “voluntary act” and
given “a real consent” to the effect that “service on the agent shall give
jurisdiction of the person.”269  Likewise, the defendant had waived its
right to contest venue.270  Moreover, the Court recognized that “state
legislation and consent of parties may bring about a state of facts
which will authorize the courts of the United States to take cognizance
of a case.”271
B. Circuit Split: Pre-Daimler, Post-International Shoe
According to most federal circuit courts, a corporation’s compliance
with a state registration statute can amount to that corporation con-
senting to personal jurisdiction in that state.272  Registration statutes,
however, vary from state to state.  Thus, at this point, whether a cor-
poration’s compliance with such a statute amounts to consent to per-
sonal jurisdiction hinges on the registration statute itself.273  For
example, a Pennsylvania statute expressly provides that
“[q]ualification as a foreign corporation under the laws of this Com-
monwealth” “constitutes a sufficient basis of jurisdiction to enable to
the tribunals of this Commonwealth to exercise general personal juris-
diction over such person . . . .”274  Thus, by registering to do business
in Pennsylvania and designating an agent for service of process, a cor-
poration consents to the general jurisdiction of Pennsylvania
courts.275
268. Id. at 167, 175.
269. Id. at 172–75; see also Forest Labs., Inc. v Amneal Pharms., LLC, No. 14-508-
LPS, 2015 WL 880599, at *8 (D. Del. Feb. 26, 2015) (quoting Olberding v. Ill.
Cent. R. Co., 346 U.S. 338, 341–42 (1953) (explaining that “in Neirbo, the defen-
dant had ‘designated an agent in New York’ upon whom a summons could be
served in that State, and that this constituted an ‘actual consent’ to be sued in
[the federal and state courts of] New York, not the [l]ess so because it was ‘part of
the bargain by which [the defendant] enjoys the business freedom of the State of
New York.’”).  The Forest Labs court explained that Olberding “applied this logic
to explain why the defendant had consented to venue in a particular court,” but
noted that it could not “think of a reason why the same logic would not apply to
the question of what amounts to ‘actual consent’ to personal jurisdiction.” Id.
270. Neirbo, 308 U.S. at 168, 175.
271. Id. at 175 (citing Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U.S. 369, 377 (1877)).
272. Forest Labs, 2015 WL 880599, at *9.  However, various commentators have sug-
gested that consent-by-registration cannot survive in a post-Daimler world. See
generally Kevin Benish, Note, Pennoyer’s Ghost: Consent, Registration Statutes,
and General Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v. Bauman, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1609
(2015); Monestier, supra note 256, at 1372–1400.
273. See Forest Labs, 2015 WL 880599, at *6.
274. Bane v. Netlink, Inc., 925 F.2d 637, 640 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5301 (West 1990)).
275. Id.
2016]REGISTRATION, FAIRNESS, GENERAL JURISDICTION 513
The Third Circuit held that such a statute is constitutional in Bane
v. Netlink, Inc., 925 F.2d 637, 641 (3d Cir. 1991).  In doing so, the
Third Circuit noted that “[c]onsent is a traditional basis for assertion
of jurisdiction long upheld as constitutional.”276  The court also noted
that “[b]y registering to do business in Pennsylvania, the [defendant]
‘purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of
its laws.’”277  And thus it stated that it “need not decide whether au-
thorization to do business in Pennsylvania is a ‘continuous and sys-
tematic’ contact with the Commonwealth for purposes of the
dichotomy between ‘general’ and ‘specific’ jurisdiction because such re-
gistration by a foreign corporation carries with it consent to be sued in
Pennsylvania courts.”278
At least four other courts of appeals have upheld the constitution-
ality of construing state registration statutes to provide jurisdiction to
courts in that state over corporations that comply with the statutes—
registering to do business in the state and appointing an agent in the
jurisdiction for service of process.  In Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines,
Inc., the Eighth Circuit followed the Minnesota Supreme Court’s in-
terpretation of the state’s registration statute and found that compli-
ance with Minnesota’s registration statute amounts to consent to
general jurisdiction in Minnesota.279  Moreover, the court noted that
“[t]he whole purpose of requiring designation of an agent for service is
to make a nonresident suable in the local courts.”280  In Holloway v.
Wright & Morrissey, Inc., the First Circuit held likewise.  It based its
holding on a “natural reading” of New Hampshire’s registration stat-
ute and posited that “[i]t is well-settled that a corporation that autho-
rizes an agent to receive service of process in compliance with the
requirements of a state statute, consents to the exercise of personal
276. Id. at 641 (citing Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356–57 (1927); Dehne v. Hill-
man Inv. Co., 110 F.2d 456, 458 (3d Cir. 1940)).
277. Id. at 640 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)).
Normally, consent jurisdiction does not involve questions of whether the defen-
dant “purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum State.”  Nonetheless, the notion that by registering to do business a
corporation is gaining the benefit of state laws only furthers the province of con-
sent to jurisdiction by registration. See, e.g., Olberding v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 346
U.S. 338, 341–42 (1953) (explaining that in Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding
Corp., 308 U.S. 165 (1939), the defendant had “designated an agent in New York”
upon whom a summons could be served in that State, and that this “constituted
an ‘actual consent’ to be sued in [the federal and state courts of] New York, not
the less so because it was ‘part of the bargain by which [the defendant] enjoys the
business freedom of the State of New York.’ ” (emphasis added)).
278. Bane, 925 F.2d at 640.
279. Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines Inc., 900 F.2d 1196, 1199–1200 (8th Cir. 1990).
280. Id. at 1199.
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jurisdiction in any action that is within the scope of the agent’s
authority.”281
The two remaining circuits appear to agree in principle with the
holdings of the First, Third, and Eighth Circuits in analyzing relevant
state court precedent.  However, these circuits ultimately held that ju-
risdiction was not proper under the facts presented.282  In King v.
American Family Mutual Insurance Co., much like the approach of
circuit courts discussed above, the Ninth Circuit noted that, “Federal
courts must, subject to federal constitutional restraints, look to state
statutes and case law in order to determine whether a foreign corpora-
tion is subject to personal jurisdiction in a given case because the cor-
poration has appointed an agent for service of process.”283  The court,
however, concluded that “[t]he Montana law regarding appointment of
an agent for service of process does not, standing alone, subject foreign
corporations to jurisdiction in Montana for acts performed outside of
Montana, at least when the corporations transact no business in the
state.”284  Similarly, in Wenche Siemer v. Learjet Acquisition Corp.,
the Fifth Circuit looked to state case law interpreting Texas’ registra-
tion statute and found that “[n]o Texas state court decision has held
that this provision acts as a consent to jurisdiction over a corporation
in a case such as ours—that is where plaintiffs are non-residents and
the defendant is not conducting substantial activity within the
state.”285
Only three circuits have held that compliance with a state registra-
tion requirement cannot be the basis for finding that a corporation
consented to general jurisdiction.286  First, in Consolidated Develop-
ment Corp. v. Sherritt, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit held that under In-
ternational Shoe appointment of an agent for service of process is not
enough to provide a court with general personal jurisdiction over a
281. Holloway v. Wright & Morrissey, Inc., 739 F.2d 695, 697 (1st Cir. 1984).
282. Forest Labs., Inc. v Amneal Pharms., LLC, No. 14-508-LPS, 2015 WL 880599, at
*9 (D. Del. Feb. 26, 2015) (“Two other Circuits appear to have come to the same
conclusion, but have gone on to analyze state court precedent and ultimately de-
termine that consent had not been granted in the instant cases, since the scope of
the particular state registration statutes at issue was not broad enough to cover
the type of legal claims implicated in the case.”).
283. King v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 632 F.3d 570, 576 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that
“Pennsylvania Fire, Chipman, and Robert Mitchell collectively stand for [this]
proposition”).
284. Id. at 578.
285. Wenche Siemer v. Learjet Acquisition Corp., 966 F.2d 179, 183 (5th Cir. 1992).
286. But see Forest Labs., 2015 WL 880599, at *9 (noting that “none of those opinions
directly address the issue of consent–i.e., why compliance with such a statute
could not, under any circumstances, amount to the kind of consent to jurisdiction
referenced in” Pa. Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93,
95–96 (1917), Robert Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Selden Breck Const. Co., 257 U.S.
213 (1921), and Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165
(1939)).
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corporation.287  Second, in Wilson v. Humphreys (Cayman) Ltd., the
Seventh Circuit noted that “[r]egistering to do business is a necessary
precursor to engaging in business activities in the forum state.”288
However, the court held that registration alone “[c]annot sat-
isfy . . . the demands of due process.”289  Moreover, the court stated
that “[s]uch an interpretation of the [relevant state registration stat-
ute] would render [the statute] constitutionally suspect.”290  Last, in
Ratliff v. Cooper Labs, Inc., the Fourth Circuit found that “[t]he princi-
ples of due process require a firmer foundation than mere compliance
with state domestication statutes.”291
After a review of these circuit court cases, one is left with uncer-
tainty as to the state of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence in the con-
text of registration statutes.  Much of a federal court’s analysis
depends on the text of the relevant statute and the holdings of state
courts interpreting the statutes, which leads to varied results.  For ex-
ample, in addition to the fact that a corporation has registered to do
business, is the court to consider the level of business a corporation
conducts in the forum state?292  Is the court to evaluate its assertion
of jurisdiction according to the standards of International Shoe and
consider issues of fundamental fairness, or is consent-based jurisdic-
tion analysis separate from International Shoe analysis?293  Moreover,
did the Supreme Court’s decision in Daimler change the circuit court
opinions discussed above?
In order to begin to answer these questions, one must look to fed-
eral court opinions rendered after Daimler.  This Article reviews nu-
merous cases that have addressed whether compliance with
registration statutes amounts to consent to personal jurisdiction.
287. Consol. Dev. Corp. v. Sherritt, Inc., 216 F.3d 1286, 1293 (11th Cir. 2000).
288. Wilson v. Humphreys (Cayman) Ltd., 916 F.2d 1239, 1245 (7th Cir. 1990).
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Ratliff v. Cooper Labs. Inc., 444 F.2d 745, 748 (4th Cir. 1971).
292. As noted by Benish, supra note 272, at 1638, some “early twentieth-century
proceduralists” viewed Supreme Court cases like Pennsylvania Fire, which is dis-
cussed below, as being grounded in a theory of “doing business” jurisdiction,
rather than consent jurisdiction.  Moreover, in Chipman, Ltd. v. Thomas B. Jef-
frey Co., 251 U.S. 373 (1920), the Court distinguished the facts before it from
prior cases because the foreign corporation at issue was no longer doing business
in New York.  Nonetheless, as discussed more below, circuit courts are not as
sure that doing business jurisdiction and consent jurisdiction are the same.  In-
deed, it may be possible to consent to jurisdiction through multiple acts—regis-
tering to do business in a jurisdiction via compliance with a registration statute
and then actually doing business in that jurisdiction.
293. See Freer, supra note 11, at *6 (noting that “in Daimler, the Court needlessly
concluded that the assessment of general jurisdiction does not entail considera-
tion of fairness factors.”).  However, the question remains as to whether fairness
factors can and should be considered when addressing consent to general
jurisdiction.
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However, this discussion will be instructed by two particular cases,
both from the United States District Court for the District of Dela-
ware, both involving substantially the same defendants, and each
reaching different results—Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. Amneal
Pharmaceuticals LLC (“Forest Labs”)294 and AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan
Pharmaceuticals Inc. (“AstraZeneca”).295
C. Post-Daimler Cases Concluding that Consent-By-
Registration Is a Valid Basis for the Exercise of
Personal Jurisdiction
Before delving into the court’s analysis, it is important to consider
briefly the relevant jurisdictional facts.296  The defendant challenging
the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction—Mylan Pharmaceuticals
(“Mylan”)—was a West Virginia corporation with its principal place of
business in Morgantown, West Virginia.297  Mylan manufactured and
distributed generic drugs throughout the United States.298  It was
registered to transact business in Delaware.299  However, Mylan had
no facilities or offices in Delaware.300  None of its employees or officers
was located in Delaware.301  Moreover, its net sales in Delaware for
the relevant year were zero.302
The court in Forest Labs entertained multiple jurisdictional issues.
However, this Article will only address the court’s discussion of
whether Mylan’s compliance with Delaware’s registration statute
amounted to Mylan consenting to Delaware courts having general per-
sonal jurisdiction over it.  The court started its analysis by noting, by
way of a heading, that “Supreme Court precedent prior to Daimler
supports the theory that a foreign corporation may consent to general
jurisdiction, and may do so by way of compliance with a state registra-
tion statute requiring appointment of an agent for service of
process.”303
The court consulted multiple cases and other authority to reach the
above conclusion.  First, it briefly addressed the history of the Su-
preme Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence.304  In reference to
294. Forest Labs., Inc. v Amneal Pharms., LLC, No. 14-508-LPS, 2015 WL 880599 (D.
Del. Feb. 26, 2015).
295. AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 3d 549 (D. Del. 2014).
296. The jurisdictional facts of Forest Labs and AstraZeneca are essentially the same.
297. Forest Labs., 2015 WL 880599, at *1.
298. Id.
299. Mylan was also registered to do business in twenty-one other states at the time of
the court’s opinion. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id. at *3.
304. Id. at *4.
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the “strict territorial approach” of Pennoyer v. Neff, which required
one to either consent or be physically present in the forum before ju-
risdiction was present, the court noted that the “presence standard
could be easily applied to individuals, but its application to a corpora-
tion was more difficult.”305  Therefore, “[s]ome states solved [the]
problem by requiring a foreign corporation to consent to general juris-
diction by the appointment of an agent for the service of process.”306
Such a sentiment undoubtedly informs the analysis surrounding mod-
ern-day registration statutes.
Next, the court recognized the obvious—International Shoe forever
changed personal jurisdiction jurisprudence.307  However, neither
party disputed that, “after International Shoe, consent remained a
valid basis upon which a Court could obtain personal jurisdiction over
a person or corporation, and that a party could consent to personal
jurisdiction in a state in a number of ways.”308  The court even de-
clared that “[t]he language of the opinion in International Shoe itself,
for example, makes clear that there, the Supreme Court did not intend
to abolish the concept that a party could consent to personal
jurisdiction.”309
The court also noted that, post-International Shoe, the Supreme
Court has held that a party may consent to personal jurisdiction.310
For example, in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites
de Guinee, the Supreme Court found that because “the requirement of
personal jurisdiction represents first of all an individual right, it can,
like other such rights, be waived.”311  Moreover, such waiver can occur
through a “variety of legal arrangements [that] have been taken to
represent express or implied consent to the personal jurisdiction of the
court.”312  These arrangements include “state procedures which find
constructive consent to the personal jurisdiction of the state court in
305. Id. (citing 16 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE—CIVIL
§ 108.23 (2012)).
306. Id. (citing 16 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE—CIVIL
§ 108.23 (2012)).
307. Id. (noting that “[t]he Supreme Court cast aside these fictions in International
Shoe”) (citing Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 604 (1990) (plurality
opinion of Scalia, J.)).
308. Id.
309. Id. (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945) (“discussing, as
prelude to the decision, certain circumstances in which a corporation’s contacts
with the state are deemed to be continuous and systematic, and noting that this
discussion related to cases where ‘no consent to be sued or authorization to an
agent to accept service of process has been given.’”).
310. Id. at *5 (noting that “the Supreme Court went on to emphasize in a number of
subsequent cases that a party may consent to personal jurisdiction where such
jurisdiction might otherwise not exist.”).
311. Id. (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,
704 (1982)).
312. Id. (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 704).
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the voluntary use of certain state procedures”—e.g., state registration
statutes.313
After considering International Shoe and Insurance Corp. of Ire-
land, the court was satisfied that a party could still validly consent to
personal jurisdiction.314  Nevertheless, the question of whether a cor-
poration could consent to personal jurisdiction through compliance
with a state registration statute remained.315  To answer this ques-
tion, the court first looked to Supreme Court decisions rendered before
International Shoe that discussed personal jurisdiction in the context
of registration statutes.316
313. Id.
314. Id. at *6.
315. Id. (“If it is clear that a party can consent to personal jurisdiction, then the next
question becomes whether one of the ways in which such consent can be mani-
fested is when a corporation complies with a state registration statute like the
one at issue here?  On that score, the Court has to conclude that, prior to Interna-
tional Shoe, the Supreme Court’s answer to this question was ‘yes.’”).
316. Id. (citing Pa. Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93, 95–96
(1917)).  Similar to the circuit court opinions discussed above, in Robert Mitchell
Furniture Co. v. Selden Breck Consrt. Co., the Court clarified its holding in Penn-
sylvania Fire and explained that federal courts should first look to how state
courts have interpreted state registration statutes to determine whether a corpo-
ration’s compliance with the statute grants the court personal jurisdiction over
the corporation:
The purpose in requiring the appointment of such an agent is primarily
to secure local jurisdiction in respect of business transacted within the
State. Of course when a foreign corporation appoints one as required by
statute it takes the risk of the construction that will be put upon the stat-
ute and the scope of the agency by the State Court. But the reasons for a
limited interpretation of a compulsory assent are hardly less strong
when the assent is expressed by the appointment of an agent than when
it is implied from going into business in the State without appointing
one . . . . Unless the state law either expressly or by local construction
gives to the appointment a larger scope, we should not construe it to ex-
tend to suits in respect of business transacted by the foreign corporation
elsewhere . . . .
Robert Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Selden Breck Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 213 at
215–16 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (citing Pa. Fire Ins. Co., 243 US. at
93).  The Supreme Court then reaffirmed Pennsylvania Fire in Neirbo Co. v. Beth-
lehem Shipbuilding Corp. Forest Labs., 2015 WL 880599, at *6 (citing Neirbo Co.
v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165 (1939)). Neirbo did not address
personal jurisdiction, but rather the issue of whether a defendant had waived the
right to contest venue in a federal court after it had complied with a state statute
and appointed an agent for service. Id. (citing Neirbo, 308 U.S. at 167, 175).
Nonetheless, the Neirbo Court cited Pennsylvania Fire and noted that by comply-
ing with the statute, the defendant had committed a “voluntary act” and given “a
real consent” to the effect that “service on the agent shall give jurisdiction of the
person.” Id. (quoting Neirbo, 308 U.S. at 172–75); Id. (quoting Olberding v. Ill.
Cent. R. Co., 346 U.S. 338, 341–42 (1953) (explaining that in Neirbo, the defen-
dant had “designated an agent in New York” upon whom a summons could be
served in that State, and that this “constituted an ‘actual consent’ to be sued in
[the federal and state courts of] New York, not the [l]ess so because it was ‘part of
the bargain by which [the defendant] enjoys the business freedom of the State of
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As stated above, in Forest Labs, Mylan did not dispute the fact that
consent to personal jurisdiction remained valid after International
Shoe.  Mylan, however, did argue that the “consent-by-registration ap-
proach . . . [could not] be squared with International Shoe, which
changed the focus of the jurisdictional inquiry from one based on a
defendant’s ‘physical presence’ in the forum State to one based on
‘substantial contacts[,]’ ‘fair play and substantial justice,’ and ‘funda-
mental fairness.’”317  The court, however, disagreed with Mylan.  Ac-
cording to the court, for Mylan’s argument to hold water,
International Shoe had to overrule cases like Pennsylvania Fire and
Neirbo, and the court concluded that International Shoe neither ex-
plicitly nor implicitly did so.318
Mylan’s most compelling argument—that International Shoe im-
plicitly overruled cases like Pennsylvania Fire and Neirbo—was taken
from Shaffer v. Heitner, in which the Supreme Court stated that “all
assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to
the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny.”319  The
court, however, was “not convinced that this portion of Shaffer was
intended to address situations in which a party affirmatively consents
to personal jurisdiction.”320  The court noted that “Shaffer addressed
the vitality of quasi in rem jurisdiction; it did not specifically address
the question of consent to personal jurisdiction, nor the concept of gen-
eral jurisdiction.”321  The court bolstered this conclusion with Justice
Scalia’s plurality opinion in Burnham, from which it gleaned that “the
statement from Shaffer was meant only to indicate that quasi in rem
jurisdiction ‘must satisfy the litigation-relatedness requirement of In-
ternational Shoe.’ ”322  Moreover, the court referenced Bendix Autolite
Corp. v. Midwesco Ents., Inc., a decision rendered well after Shaffer in
which “the Supreme Court again suggested that appointment of an
New York.’”).  The Forest Labs court explained that Olberding “applied this logic
to explain why the defendant had consented to venue in a particular court,” but
noted that it could not “think of a reason why the same logic would not apply to
the question of what amounts to ‘actual consent’ to personal jurisdiction.” Id.
Likewise, the court recognized how a defendant could waive its right to contest
venue in a similar manner. Id. at *8 (citing Neirbo, 308 U.S. at 167, 175).  Moreo-
ver, the Court recognized that “state legislation and consent of parties may bring
about a state of facts which will authorize the courts of the United States to take
cognizance of a case.” Id. at *6 (quoting Neirbo, 308 U.S. 172–75).
317. Forest Labs., 2015 WL 880599, at *7.
318. Id.
319. Id. (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977)).
320. Id.; see also Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 73 F. Supp. 3d 572,
589 n. 13 (D. Del. 2015) (distinguishing Shaffer because it did not “apply to situa-
tions in which a defendant has consented to jurisdiction, or has otherwise waived
the requirement of personal jurisdiction”).
321. Forest Labs., 2015 WL 880599, at *7 (citing Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212–16).
322. Id. (quoting Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 620–21 (1990) (plurality
opinion of Scalia, J.)).
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agent for service of process can amount to consent to general
jurisdiction.”323
Through its review of circuit court cases and Supreme Court cases
pre and post-International Shoe, the court formulated a three-part
conclusion regarding consent-by-registration:
(1) if a foreign corporation designated an agent for service of process in compli-
ance with a state registration statute of the kind at issue here, and (2) if the
statute’s text (as further interpreted by the courts of that state) was broad
enough to encompass service of process as to the type of lawsuit at issue, then
(3) the corporation, by complying with the state statute, had demonstrated
actual, voluntary consent to personal jurisdiction in the state’s courts with
regard to that particular suit.324
The court next turned to the state registration scheme at issue,
specifically sections 376 and 371 of the Delaware Code.  Section 376
provides that:
(a) All process issued out of any court of this State, all orders made by any
court of this State, all rules and notices of any kind required to be served on
any foreign corporation which has qualified to do business in this State may
be served on the registered agent of the corporation designated in accordance
with § 371 of this title, or, if there be no such agent, then on any officer, direc-
tor or other agent of the corporation then in this State.325
Meanwhile, section 371 states that “[n]o foreign corporation shall
do any business in this State . . . until it shall have paid the Secretary
of State of this State for the use of this State, $80, and shall have filed
in the office of the Secretary of State . . . [a] statement . . . setting forth
(i) the name and address of its registered agent in this State . . . .”326
Neither section 371 nor section 376 of the Delaware Code explains
the scope of the Delaware registration scheme—for what type of ac-
323. Id. (citing Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 889
(1988) (“To be present in Ohio, a foreign corporation must appoint an agent for
service of process, which operates as consent to the general jurisdiction of the
Ohio courts.”).
324. Id. at *6 (citing King v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 632 F.3d 570, 573–74 (9th Cir.
2011)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 44 cmt. c (AM.
LAW. INST. 1971) (“If a corporation has authorized an agent or a public official to
accept service of process in actions brought against it in the state, the extent of
the authority thereby conferred is a question of interpretation of the instrument
in which the consent is expressed and of the statute, if any, in pursuance of which
the consent is given. It is a question of interpretation whether the authority ex-
tends to all causes of action or is limited to causes of action arising from business
done in the state . . . . By qualifying under one of these statutes, the corporation
renders itself subject to whatever suits may be brought against it within the terms
of the statutory consent as interpreted by the local courts provided that this inter-
pretation is one that may fairly be drawn from the language of the enactment.”
(emphasis added)).
325. Forest Labs., 2015 WL 880599, at *10 (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 376 (West
2016)).
326. Id. (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 371 (West 2016)).
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tions registration of an agent for service is effective.327  In line with its
three-part conclusion and because the statute itself was silent, the
court looked to state court interpretations of the statute to determine
whether it was broad enough to encompass service of process as to the
type of lawsuit at issue.328
Luckily, the Delaware Supreme Court had already interpreted the
breadth of the statute.  In Sternberg v. O’Neil, the Delaware Supreme
Court concluded that “when [a defendant corporation] qualifie[s] as a
foreign corporation, pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 371, and appoint[s] a reg-
istered agent for service of process, pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 376, [it]
consent[s] to the exercise of general jurisdiction by the Courts of Dela-
ware.”329  In reaching its conclusion, the Sternberg Court compared
sections 371 and 376 to section 382 of the Delaware registration stat-
ute, which the court characterized as a long-arm statute.330  Through
section 382, a corporation transacting business in Delaware implicitly
consents to the jurisdiction of Delaware courts.331  On the other hand,
in reference to Pennsylvania Fire and Neirbo, the Sternberg court ex-
plained that a corporation expressly consents to the jurisdiction of Del-
aware courts when it appoints an agent for service of process under
section 376.332
The Sternberg court was also mindful of the Supreme Court’s state-
ment in Shaffer that “ ‘all assertions of state court jurisdiction must be
evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe
and its progeny.’”333  But Shaffer did not alter the court’s conclusion.
It concluded that the statement from Shaffer, “read in con-
text, . . . stands for the proposition that all assertions of state court
jurisdiction based upon legal fictions must be evaluated according to
the standards set forth in International Shoe.”334  Because the corpo-
ration in Sternberg had complied with the registration statute and
thus expressly consented to jurisdiction, the court concluded that no
minimum contacts analysis was required.335
Naturally, and regardless of the scope of the registration statute at
issue, before one can argue that a corporation has consented to per-
sonal jurisdiction through compliance with a registration statute, it
must be established that the corporation actually complied with the
327. Id.
328. Id. at *10–11.
329. Id. at *11 (quoting Sternberg v. O’Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1115 (Del. 1988)).
330. Id. at *10 (citing Sternberg, 550 A.2d at 1115–16).
331. Id.
332. Id. (citing Sternberg, 550 A.2d at 1116).
333. Id. at *11 (citing Sternberg, 550 A.2d at 1116).
334. Id.
335. Id. (quoting Sternberg, 550 A.2d at 1116–17).
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registration statute.336  In Forest Labs, Mylan had been registered to
do business in Delaware since at least April 2010—when it complied
with the Delaware registration statute and appointed an agent in Del-
aware to accept service.337
Instead of contesting this, Mylan argued that even if it was “possi-
ble for the mere act of registering to transact business in a State to
confer general jurisdiction, the Sternberg court’s interpretation of the
Delaware registration statute [was] unconstitutional.”338  Mylan sug-
gested that the registration statute must expressly state that through
compliance with the statute a corporation consents to personal juris-
diction in all cases.339  Otherwise, according to Mylan, a corporation
would not have adequate notice of the “consequences flowing from the
decision to register.”340
The court again was not persuaded.  It noted that the Sternberg
decision was issued twenty-two years before Mylan registered to do
business in Delaware, and that the Supreme Court has “[r]epeatedly
made it clear exactly where a corporation like Mylan should look to
obtain ‘notice’ as to the impact such registration could have on ques-
tions of personal jurisdiction—to both the registration statute’s text,
and to the interpretation given to that text by the State’s highest
court.”341  Therefore, the court could not envision how Mylan would be
taken by surprise if sued in Delaware after complying with the regis-
tration statute.342  Moreover, the court noted that “[i]n at least such a
circumstance, [it could not] see how maintenance of the suit would
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice on ‘no-
tice’ grounds.”343
The court’s last battle was whether, given all of the above, Daimler
changed things.344  Mylan argued that regardless of whether consent-
336. See id. at *6; see also Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Zydus Noveltech Inc., No. 14-cv-
1104-RGA, 2015 WL 4720578, at *4 (D. Del. Aug. 7, 2015) (stating that “Defen-
dant has not registered to do business in Delaware, and thus no consent to gen-
eral jurisdiction similar to that in Acorda can be found.”).
337. Forest Labs., 2015 WL 880599, at *12.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id. (citing Sternberg, 550 A.2d at 1115) (“Robert Mitchell thus confirms that fed-
eral courts should look first and foremost to a state’s construction of its own stat-
ute to determine whether appointment of an agent for service of process is a
sufficient basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a foreign corpora-
tion.” (quoting Robert Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Selden Breck Constr. Co., 257
U.S. 213, 216 (1921); King v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 632 F.3d 570, 575 (9th
Cir. 2011))).
342. Id.
343. Id. (citing Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 73 F. Supp. 3d 572
(D. Del. 2015)); cf. Rockefeller Univ. v. Ligand Pharms. Inc., 581 F. Supp. 2d 461,
466 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)).
344. See discussion supra section VI.B for a discussion of Daimler.
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by-registration was valid beforehand, the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Daimler rendered it invalid.345  Once again, the court disagreed and
found that Daimler did not change the law regarding consent to gen-
eral jurisdiction.346
While Mylan contended that Daimler eviscerated the kind of con-
sent jurisdiction discussed in Pennsylvania Fire, the Daimler Court
never stated that it was overruling Pennsylvania Fire or cases that
came after it, like Neirbo.347  In fact, the Daimler opinion never men-
tioned those cases.348  The court in Forest Labs noted that Daimler
brought up the concept of consent jurisdiction only once—and in a way
that hurt Mylan’s argument.349  In Daimler, the Court “[r]eferred to
(and relie[d] on) Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. as ‘the
textbook case of general jurisdiction appropriately exercised over a
foreign corporation that has not consented to suit in the forum.’ ”350
Thus, the “one instance in which Daimler mention[ed] consent to ju-
risdiction—in the context of a discussion regarding general jurisdic-
tion—it [did] so to distinguish the concept of consent from the
circumstances relevant to its decision.”351  Overall, the district court
found it hard to read Daimler as overruling “nearly century-old Su-
preme Court precedent” when “(1) Daimler never says it is doing any
such thing; and (2) what Daimler does say about consent to jurisdic-
tion suggests just the opposite.”352
Mylan took the drastic position that, after Daimler, corporations
could never consent to general jurisdiction.353  Of course, the court
smoked out Mylan’s position and eventually Mylan agreed that a cor-
poration could consent to general jurisdiction by contract.354  None-
theless, Mylan rightfully attempted to distinguish contractual consent
from consent-by-registration.355  The court agreed that consent-by-re-
gistration was “different,” but it ultimately found that, in light of Su-
preme Court precedent like Pennsylvania Fire, “differences in the
345. Forest Labs., 2015 WL 880599, at *13.
346. Id. at *12–13.
347. Id. at *13.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id. (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 755–76 (2014)).
351. Id.
352. Id. at *13 n.15 (citing Gucci Am., Inc., v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122, 136 n.15 (2d
Cir. 2014); Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. China Merchs. Bank, 589 Fed. Appx. 550, 553 (2d
Cir. 2014) (noting that “perhaps for this reason, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit has suggested, post-Daimler, that a district court
should consider whether a party has consented to personal jurisdiction in New
York by applying for authorization to do business in New York and thus designat-
ing the New York Secretary of State as its agent for service of process.”)
353. Id. at *13–14.
354. Id. at *14.
355. Id.
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form of consent should not make a difference in the outcome [of the
case]” because “[consent-by-registration] is a valid form of ‘real con-
sent’ to personal jurisdiction—one just as valid as consent by
contract.”356
Mylan also argued that “if registration alone made [it] ‘at home’ in
Delaware,” then it would also be at home in the twenty-one other
states in which it was registered to do business.357  A result, according
to Mylan, that “Daimler addressed and rejected.”358  The court con-
ceded that if others adopted its rationale, “Mylan could be subject to
personal jurisdiction in many states around the country (as to at least
certain legal actions).”359  Nevertheless, the court found that Mylan’s
argument “ignore[d] the different and unique role that consent plays
in the personal jurisdiction analysis.”360  The court noted that it was
not suggesting that Mylan was “essentially at home” in Delaware—
this is of course in response to Daimler’s mandate that corporations
must be “essentially at home” to be subject to general jurisdiction, and
its position that corporations cannot be “at home” in many different
states.361  Rather, for jurisdictional purposes, the court stated that
Mylan was “at home” in likely one state only—West Virginia.362  The
court explained, however, that “even if it is at home in only one State,
surely Mylan can freely agree to be subject to personal jurisdiction in
other states—so long as that consent is knowing and voluntary in the
eyes of the law.”363
Forest Laboratories provides a comprehensive analysis of how con-
sent-by-registration works and why it remains a valid basis for per-
sonal jurisdiction after Daimler. However, there are still a few other
cases worth considering—Hoffman v. McGraw-Hill Finance Inc.,
Senju Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. v. Metrics Inc., and Otsuka Pharma-
ceutical Co. Ltd. v. Mylan Inc.
Unlike the other cases considered in this part, Hoffman is a New
Jersey state court case holding that consent-by-registration is valid
post-Daimler.  In Hoffman, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants
consented to personal jurisdiction in New Jersey by registering to do
business there and appointing an agent for service of process.364  Pre-
dictably, the defendants responded by invoking Daimler and argued
that because merely doing business in a state is not enough to confer
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Hoffman v. McGraw-Hill Fin., Inc., No. ESX-C-216-13, 2014 WL 7639158, at *4
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Dec. 31, 2014).
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jurisdiction over a corporation in that state, “then merely registering
to conduct business within a state can no longer be a basis for exercis-
ing personal jurisdiction.”365  The defendants then cited AstraZeneca
AB v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (discussed below) for the proposi-
tion that finding jurisdiction based on compliance with a registration
statute would be “specifically at odds with Daimler.”366
The court disagreed with the holding of AstraZeneca.367  In doing
so, it adopted the view taken by the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York in Beach v. Citigroup Alternative
Investments LLC.368  In Beach, the court “held that notwithstanding
Daimler’s holding that a state may assert general jurisdiction only
when the defendant corporation is at home in that state, a corporation
may nevertheless consent to jurisdiction by registering as a foreign
corporation and designating a local agent to accept service of process
under New York’s corporation law.”369  This only furthers the notion
that while Daimler undoubtedly narrows the reach of general jurisdic-
tion, it has nothing to do with personal jurisdiction based on
consent.370
Senju is a case from the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of New Jersey.  Like Forest Labs and Hoffman, the court found
that Daimler had no effect on consent-by-registration.371  Unlike
those cases, however, Senju explored in greater depth how Burnham
365. Id. at *5.
366. Id.
367. Id. at *6.  The court also invoked Goodyear and noted that in reaching its conclu-
sion “that North Carolina could not exercise jurisdiction over the defendant, the
Supreme Court specifically considered the fact that the defendant was not regis-
tered to do business in North Carolina.” Id. (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Oper-
ations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2852 (2011)).
368. Id.
369. Id. (citing Beach v. Citigroup Alt. Invs. LLC, No. 12 Civ. 7717(PKC), 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 30032 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2014)).
370. Id. (quoting Bailen v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., No. 190318/12, 2014 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 3554, at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 5, 2014)) (“[a]lthough Daimler clearly nar-
rows the reach of New York courts in terms of its exercise of general jurisdiction
over foreign entities, it does not change the law with respect to personal jurisdic-
tion based on consent.”); id. (“[I]n Daimler, while the Court held that merely con-
ducting business within a state is not enough to confer general jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court was concerned only with whether California could properly exer-
cise general jurisdiction over the defendants. As such, the Court was tasked with
determining whether the defendants’ contacts with California were sufficiently
continuous and systematic so as to render the defendants essentially at home in
California. The Court did not, however, analyze the separate and distinct issue of
whether the defendants had consented to jurisdiction in California.”); see also
Bane v. Netlink, Inc., 925 F.2d 637, 640 (3d Cir. 1991) (explaining the district
court had only considered general jurisdiction and not consent to jurisdiction).
371. Senju Pharms., Co., Ltd. v. Metrics Inc., 96 F. Supp. 3d 428, 427 (D.N.J. 2015)
(“Contrary to Defendants’ contention, [Daimler], did not disturb the consent-by-
in-state service rule described in Burnham.”).
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affected the issue.  The court noted that Burnham “explained that the
long-standing in-state service rule does not require an independent
inquiry into whether ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice’ were observed, because ‘a doctrine that dates back to the adop-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment and is still generally observed un-
questionably meets that standard.’”372  Moreover, the court pointed
out that the Burnham court “explicitly stated that the in-state service
rule ‘remains the practice of, not only a substantial number of the
States, but as far as we are aware all the States and the Federal Gov-
ernment.’”373  In doing so, the Burnham court cited a string of cases
“[i]ncluding, importantly, some applying the in-state service rule to
foreign corporate defendants accepting service by agent.”374
Otsuka is another case from the District of New Jersey that ad-
dresses consent-by-registration.375  Again, like the preceding cases,
Otsuka treated consent jurisdiction as a doctrine separate from the
International Shoe analysis.376  The court even went as far as saying
that it “need not belabor [defendant’s] arguments, because it cannot
be genuinely disputed that consent, whether by registration or other-
wise, remains a valid basis for personal jurisdiction following Interna-
tional Shoe and Daimler.”377  Ultimately, like in Forest Labs, the
court found in review of Supreme Court and circuit court opinions
“[c]ear confirmation that designation of an in-state agent for service of
process in accordance with a state registration statute may constitute
consent to personal jurisdiction, if supported by the breadth of the
statute’s text or interpretation.”378
In its conclusion, the Otsuka court held that the defendants “con-
sented to the Court’s jurisdiction by registering to do business in New
Jersey, by appointing an in-state agent for service of process in New
Jersey, and by actually engaging in a substantial amount of business
in this State.”379  While the level of business that a corporation en-
372. Id. (quoting Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 628, 640 (1990)).
373. Id. (quoting Burnham, 495 U.S. at 615–16).
374. Id. (citing Burnham, 495 U.S. at 615–16).
375. Like Forest Labs and AstraZenca, it involved Mylan Pharmaceuticals.
376. See Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Mylan Inc., 106 F. Supp. 3d 456, 467 (D.N.J.
2015) (“International Shoe itself clearly reflects that the Supreme Court’s juris-
dictional determinations related to cases where ‘no consent to be sued or authori-
zation to an agent to accept service of process has been given.’” (citing Int’l Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945))).
377. Id.
378. Id. at 468 (citing Forest. Labs., v. Amneal Pharms. LLC, No. 14–508–LPS, 2015
WL 880599, at *6 (D. Del. Feb. 26, 2015)) (noting that, in Robert Mitchell, the
Supreme Court “emphasized that, in appointing an agent, a foreign corporation
‘takes the risk of the construction that will be put upon the statute and the scope
of the agency by the State Court.’” (quoting Robert Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Sel-
den Breck Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 213, 216 (1921))).
379. Id. at 470 (emphasis added).
2016]REGISTRATION, FAIRNESS, GENERAL JURISDICTION 527
gaged in within the forum state normally would play no role in con-
sent-by-registration analysis, the court so noted in order to refute the
defendants’ reliance on prior District of New Jersey cases and Ratliff
v. Cooper Labs., Inc., a Fourth Circuit case.380  In those cases, the
courts found that a corporation’s compliance with the New Jersey re-
gistration statue was insufficient to confer general jurisdiction in the
absence of evidence that the corporation conducted business in New
Jersey.381
Most recently, in In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litigation (“In
re Syngenta”), the United States District Court for the District of Kan-
sas concluded that consent through registration remains a valid basis
for a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporate
defendant after Daimler.382  In In re Syngenta, two corporate defend-
ants, Syngenta Seeds, LLC and Syngenta Crop Protection, LLC, while
having offices and employees in Kansas, were neither incorporated in
Kansas nor had their principal place of business in Kansas.383  How-
ever, both had registered to do business in Kansas under the Kansas
registration statute.384  The defendant corporations moved to dismiss
380. Id. at 470 n.14.
381. The fact that a corporation is registered and engaging in a substantial amount of
business in a state would appear to change the outcome of cases like King v. Am.
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 632 F.3d 570 (9th Cir. 2011) and Wenche Siemer v. Learjet
Acquisition Corp., 966 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1992), which are discussed above.
382. In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litigation, No. 14-md-2591-JWL, 2016 WL
1047996, at *3 (D. Kan. Mar. 11, 2016).
383. Id. at *1.
384. Id.  The relevant portion of the Kansas registration statute states:
Before doing business in the state of Kansas, a foreign covered entity
shall register with the secretary of state. In order to register, a foreign
covered entity shall submit to the secretary of state, together with pay-
ment of a fee if authorized by law, as provided by K.S.A. 17-7910, and
amendments thereto, an original copy executed by a governor, of an ap-
plication for registration as a foreign covered entity, setting forth:
(a) The name of the foreign covered entity;
(b) the state or other jurisdiction or country where organized;
(c) the date of its organization;
(d) a statement issued within 90 days of the date of application by
the proper officer of the jurisdiction where such foreign entity is organ-
ized, or by a third-party agent authorized by such proper officer, that the
foreign covered entity exists in good standing under the laws of the juris-
diction of its organization;
(e) the nature of the business or purposes to be conducted or pro-
moted in the state of Kansas, including whether the covered entity oper-
ates for-profit or not-for-profit;
(f) the address of the registered office and the name and address of
the resident agent for service of process required to be maintained by
this act;
(g) an irrevocable written consent of the foreign covered entity that
actions may be commenced against it in the proper court of any county
where there is proper venue by the service of process on the secretary of
state as provided for in K.S.A. 60-304, and amendments thereto, and stip-
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the action against the non-Kansas corporate defendants, asserting
that the court had no basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over these defendants.385  Plaintiffs argued that by registering to do
business in Kansas pursuant to the Kansas registration statute, the
two corporations  “consented to general jurisdiction over them in Kan-
sas courts and that such consent is sufficient to support
jurisdiction.”386
In resolving this question, the court looked to prior jurisprudence
of the United States Supreme Court and the Kansas Supreme Court
on the issue.387  Concluding this review, the court stated:
It is clear that at one time, under the jurisprudence of the United States Su-
preme Court, such consent by registration was sufficient to overcome a chal-
lenge to personal jurisdiction. See Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. of Philadelphia
v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93, 96 (1917); Robert Mitchell
Furniture Co. v. Selden Breck Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 213, 214-16 (1921); Neirbo
Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 167-75 (1939); see also
Forest Labs., Inc. v. Amneal Pharmaceuticals LLC, 2015 WL 880599, at *6 (D.
Del. Feb. 26, 2015) (discussing these Supreme Court cases). Moreover, in Rob-
ert Mitchell Furniture, the Supreme Court indicated that a state’s construc-
tion of its own statute determines the effect of the registration. See Robert
Mitchell Furniture, 257 U.S. at 215-16. The Kansas Supreme Court has held
that the Kansas registration statute requires a consent to general personal
jurisdiction, that is, jurisdiction even in cases not arising from or related to
the defendant’s actions in the state. See Merriman v. Crompton Corp., 282
Kan. 433, 443-45 (2006). Thus, under Pennsylvania Fire and its progeny, the
registering Syngenta defendants have consented to personal jurisdiction in
Kansas.388
Defendants argued that the court should not rely upon Penn-
sylvania Fire and its progeny, because all of these cases predated In-
ternational Shoe in which the Court established the modern personal
jurisdiction paradigm.389  The court rejected this argument on the fol-
lowing grounds: (1) that no basis existed to conclude that Interna-
tional Shoe overturned these cases recognizing consent to personal
jurisdiction through registration; (2) that following the decision in In-
ternational Shoe, the Court continued to suggest the viability of juris-
diction through consent; and (3) that “various federal circuit courts
have endorsed the concept of consent by registration since Interna-
ulating and agreeing that such service shall be taken and held, in all
courts, to be as valid and binding as if due service had been made upon
the governors of the foreign covered entity;
(h) the date on which the foreign covered entity first did, or intends
to do, business in the state of Kansas.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7931 (West 2016) (emphasis added).
385. In re Syngenta, 2016 WL 1047996, at *1.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id. at *2.
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tional Shoe.”390  The court also rejected the argument that even if con-
sent to jurisdiction through registration survived International Shoe,
the decision by the Supreme Court in Daimler rejected registration as
a basis for general jurisdiction.391
Finally, the court rejected the arguments by the corporate defend-
ants that consent to jurisdiction through registration is unconstitu-
tional, either as a violation of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
or as a violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause.392  As to the un-
constitutional conditions doctrine, the court concluded that consent to
jurisdiction through registration does not coerce a corporation “into
giving up a constitutional right by denying a benefit to that [corpora-
390. Id. at *2 (citing Holloway v. Wright & Morrissey, Inc., 739 F.2d 695, 697 (1st Cir.
1984) (citing Pennsylvania Fire and Neirbo in noting that it is “well-settled” that
a corporation may consent to jurisdiction through registration)); Bane v. Netlink,
Inc., 925 F.2d 637, 640 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating that defendant consented to juris-
diction through registration); Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 900 F.2d 1196,
1199 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding consent through state registration statute); see also
Wenche Siemer v. Learjet Acquisition Corp., 966 F.2d 179, 180–81 (5th Cir. 1992)
(interpreting particular state statute as not providing necessary consent to gen-
eral jurisdiction); King v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 632 F.3d 570, 576–78
(9th Cir. 2011) (citing Pennsylvania Fire and Robert Mitchell Furniture in holding
that a court must look to state law to determine the effect of registration on juris-
diction, before concluding that the particular state statute did not require con-
sent).  It is true that three circuit courts have seemingly held that mere
compliance with a registration statute does not support jurisdiction, but those
cases are of little persuasive value because the courts did not directly address the
issue of consent or the relevant Supreme Court jurisprudence. See Consol. Dev.
Corp. v. Sherritt, Inc., 216 F.3d 1286, 1293 (11th Cir. 2000); Wilson v. Hum-
phreys (Cayman) Ltd., 916 F.2d 1239, 1245 (7th Cir. 1990); Ratliff v. Cooper
Labs., Inc., 444 F.2d 745, 748 (4th Cir. 1971).
391. 2016 WL 1047996, at *2-3.  As the court stated:
As discussed above, the Supreme Court has continued to sanction per-
sonal jurisdiction by consent even after International Shoe, and the
Court has not overruled its precedents concerning consent through regis-
tration. The Court is not prepared to ignore such Supreme Court prece-
dent based on speculation about how the Court might view jurisdiction
in contexts other than that discussed in Daimler. Rather, the Court is
persuaded by the reasoning of courts that have rejected similar argu-
ments based on Daimler. See, e.g., Forest Labs., 2015 WL 880599, at *3-
15; Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., 78 F. Supp.
3d 572, 583-92 (D. Del. 2015); Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. v. Mylan
Inc., 106 F. Supp. 3d 456, 467-71 (D.N.J. 2015).2 Syngenta argues that if
a company is not necessarily subject to general jurisdiction in every state
in which it does business (under Daimler), it should not be subject to
general jurisdiction in every state in which it must execute a consent as
a prerequisite to doing business. As the Acorda court stated, however,
such a result may seem odd, but because consent remains a valid basis
for personal jurisdiction under the law of the Supreme Court, that result
must be permitted. See Acorda, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 591.
Id. at *3 (footnote omitted).
392. Id. at *3–4.
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tion] because of the exercise of that right.”393  As to the Dormant Com-
merce Clause, the court concluded that because the result of consent
to jurisdiction through registration “is that out-of-state companies are
subjected to the jurisdiction of Kansas’s courts, just as resident com-
panies are subject to the jurisdiction of those courts,” no violation ex-
ists because foreign corporations are treated no differently than
resident corporations.394
393. Id. at *3.  In finding no violation, the court stated:
Syngenta argues that such a requirement of consent would violate the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which prevents the government
from coercing a person into giving up a constitutional right by denying a
benefit to that person because of the exercise of that right. See Koontz v.
St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2594 (2013). The
Court rejects this argument. Syngenta relies on two cases in which the
Supreme Court ruled that a state could not require a company to give up
the right to remove cases to federal court as a condition of doing business
there. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Denton, 146 U.S. 202, 207 (1892); Terral
v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529, 532 (1922). In Neirbo, one of the suc-
cessor cases to Pennsylvania Fire discussed above, however, the Su-
preme Court distinguished Denton as a case involving “an entirely
different situation,” as the statute in Denton sought to deny access to
federal courts. See Neirbo, 308 U.S. at 173. As in Neirbo, the consent in
the present case does not similarly deprive Syngenta of access to federal
courts.  Syngenta has not cited any other precedent to support applica-
tion of this doctrine in this context. In light of the Supreme Court prece-
dent sanctioning consent by registration as a basis for jurisdiction, the
Court cannot conclude that giving effect to Syngenta’s consent in this
case would be unconstitutional.
Id. at *3–4.
394. Id. at *4.  In finding no Dormant Commerce Clause violation, the court stated:
Similarly, the Court rejects Syngenta’s argument that giving effect to
the consent would violate the Dormant Commerce Clause. In support of
this argument, Syngenta relies solely on Bendix Autolite Corp. v.
Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888 (1988). In that case, the Su-
preme Court ruled that an Ohio statute that tolled limitations periods
for claims against corporate defendants that had not registered in the
state (which registration operated as a consent to general jurisdiction)
violated the Dormant Commerce Clause. See id. In so ruling, however,
the Court relied on the result that an out-of-state corporation was
treated differently from an instate corporation with respect to tolling.
See id. at 894-95. In these cases, the result of the consent through regis-
tration is that out-of-state companies are subjected to the jurisdiction of
Kansas’s courts, just as resident companies are subject to the jurisdic-
tion of those courts—which means that the statute does not treat out-of-
state companies differently. Thus, the reasoning of Bendix is not applica-
ble here. Syngenta has not cited any caselaw to support invalidating con-
sent jurisdiction under the Dormant Commerce Clause. In the absence of
such authority, and in light of the Supreme Court cases sanctioning such
jurisdiction, the Court will not refuse to give effect to Syngenta’s consent
in these cases.
Id.
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D. Post-Daimler Cases Concluding that Consent-By-
Registration Is Not a Valid Basis for the Exercise of
Personal Jurisdiction
AstraZeneca involved the same defendant as Forest Laboratories—
Mylan Pharmaceuticals—and the same court, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Delaware.  However, the AstraZeneca
court reached a different result. It held that, in light of Daimler, My-
lan’s compliance with the Delaware registration statute did not
amount to Mylan consenting to the general jurisdiction of Delaware
courts.395
The plaintiff argued that the defendant consented to the jurisdic-
tion of Delaware courts by registering to do business and appointing
an agent for service of process in compliance with the Delaware regis-
tration statute.396  It contended that consent ends the jurisdictional
inquiry and obviates the need to consider due process and minimum
contacts, and argued that “Supreme Court cases holding that personal
jurisdiction is satisfied merely by complying with state business regis-
tration statutes remain a viable path to finding jurisdiction even after
International Shoe and its progeny.”397  Moreover, the plaintiff con-
tended that Daimler plays no role in the consent analysis because it
“dealt with the minimum-contacts aspect of International Shoe, which
is distinct from the question of consent.”398
The AstraZeneca court, however, was not convinced that Interna-
tional Shoe and Daimler had no bearing on consent.  It noted the Su-
preme Court has not “expressly addressed the continuing vitality of
cases like Neirbo and [Pennsylvania Fire] in the wake of International
Shoe.”399  With a passing citation to International Shoe, the court pro-
pounded that:
395. AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 3d 549, 556–57 (D. Del.
2014).  It is worth mentioning that the plaintiff also argued that Mylan was sub-
ject to the general jurisdiction of Delaware courts merely because it had regis-
tered to do business and had “a broad network of third-party contacts within the
state.”  Predictably, the court disagreed and found that these facts were not
enough to show that Mylan was “essentially at home” in Delaware.  This conclu-
sion demonstrates that a corporation registering to do business, absent a consent
jurisdiction argument, is not alone enough for a court to exercise general jurisdic-
tion over the corporation. Id. at 554–55.
396. Id. at 555.
397. Id.
398. Id. at 556 (“[E]xpress consent is a valid basis for the exercise of general jurisdic-
tion in the absence of any other basis for the exercise of jurisdiction, i.e. ‘mini-
mum contacts.’” (citing Sternberg v. O’Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1111 (Del. 1988))).
399. Id. at 556 (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977) (noting this was the
Court’s only real mention of cases like Pennsylvania Fire and Neirbo, and it is
unclear what, if anything, the Supreme Court’s failure to discuss these cases has
to do with their “continuing vitality”); see also Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Campagnie des
Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 704 (1982) (stating the Court has upheld that
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Both consent and minimum contacts (and all questions regarding personal ju-
risdiction) are rooted in due process. Just as minimum contacts must be pre-
sent so as not to offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice,” the defendant’s alleged “consent” to jurisdiction must do the
same.400
Unlike the courts in Forest Laboratories and Acorda, the As-
traZeneca court engaged in virtually no discussion of consent jurisdic-
tion as a doctrine separate from the jurisdictional analysis of
International Shoe401—even though International Shoe itself noted
that it concerned cases where “no consent to be sued or authorization
to an agent to accept service of process [had] been given.”402  Other
binding Supreme Court cases, both pre and post-International Shoe,
had referenced consent jurisdiction as a separate basis for jurisdic-
tion.403  Even further, the Daimler Court cited Perkins v. Benguet
Consol. Mining Co. as ‘the textbook case of general jurisdiction appro-
priately exercised over a foreign corporation that has not consented to
suit in the forum.’ ”404  Seemingly, the AstraZeneca court hung its hat
on the lone statement in Shaffer that “all assertions of state-court ju-
risdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in
International Shoe and its progeny,” without bothering to consider the
context in which the statement was made or subsequent interpreta-
tions of the statement, such as Justice Scalia’s in Burnham.405
certain legal arrangements “represent express or implied consent to the personal
jurisdiction of the court,” including “voluntary use of certain state procedures”);
cf. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (urg-
ing lower courts to follow Supreme Court precedent that “has direct application
in a case”); Forest Labs. v. Amneal Pharm. LLC, No. 14–508–LPS, 2015 WL
880599, at *7 (citing Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 14–15, 19–20 (2005)
(noting that it was a “prudent course” for a lower court to apply prior Supreme
Court precedent that had not been expressly overruled)).
400. AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 556 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 316 (1945)).
401. See id. at 555–57.
402. See Otsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Mylan Inc., 106 F. Supp. 3d 456, 467 (D.N.J.
2015) (“International Shoe itself clearly reflects that the Supreme Court’s juris-
diction determinations related to cases where “no consent to be sued or authoriza-
tion to an agent to accept service of process has been given.” (citing Int’l Shoe, 326
U.S. at 317)).
403. See Campagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694; Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165 (1939); Robert Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Selden
Breck Const. Co., 257 U.S. 213 (1921); Pa. Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining &
Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93, 95–96 (1917). But see Benish, supra note 272, at
1638–39 (noting that there is support for the notion that “doing business” juris-
diction and consent jurisdiction are one the same in the context of business
entities.).
404. Forest Labs., Inc. v Amneal Pharms., LLC, No. 14-508-LPS, 2015 WL 880599, at
*13 (D. Del. Feb. 26, 2015) (citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 755–56
(2014)).
405. AstraZeneca, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 556 (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212
(1977)).
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Instead, the court focused on the cornerstone of Daimler, that
merely “doing business” in a state is insufficient to subject a corpora-
tion to the general jurisdiction of the state’s courts.406  The court
found that “[i]n light of the holding in Daimler, . . . Mylan’s compliance
with Delaware’s registration statutes—mandatory for doing business
within the state—[could not] constitute consent to jurisdiction, and
the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Sternberg [could] no longer
be said to comport with federal due process.”407  Moreover, the court
noted that “[f]inding mere compliance with such statutes sufficient to
satisfy jurisdiction would expose companies with a national presence
(such as Mylan) to suit all over the country, a result specifically at
odds with Daimler.”408  In sum, the court characterized registration
statutes like Delaware’s as “administrative” statutes that “merely out-
line procedures for doing business in the state; compliance does not
amount to consent to jurisdiction or waiver of due process.”409  None-
theless, the court conceded that statutes, like the Pennsylvania stat-
ute, which the Third Circuit addressed in Bane v. Netlink, Inc., may
lead to different results.410
In Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,411 the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit confronted the “nettlesome and increasingly conten-
tious question about the import of a foreign corporation’s registration
to conduct business and appointment of an agent for service of process
in a state for the exercise of personal jurisdiction by that state’s courts
over the registered corporation.”412  In Brown, the court affirmed the
dismissal of personal injury claims brought in Connecticut against
Lockheed, a company that is incorporated and maintains its principal
place of business in Maryland, after concluding that Lockheed was not
subject to the general jurisdiction of the Connecticut courts.413  The
court reached this conclusion even though Lockheed derived about
$160 million in revenue for its Connecticut-based work, was registered
to conduct business in Connecticut, leased office spaces, maintained
406. Id. at 555–57.
407. Id. at 556.
408. Id. at 557.
409. Id.
410. Id. at 557 n.6 (“The court does not address the more difficult question raised
when state statutes expressly indicate that foreign corporations consent to gen-
eral jurisdiction by complying with the statutes.”); see, e.g., Bane v. Netlink, Inc.,
925 F.2d 637, 640 (3d Cir. 1991) (“The existence of any of the following relation-
ships between a person and this Commonwealth shall constitute a sufficient ba-
sis of jurisdiction to enable the tribunals of this Commonwealth to exercise
general personal jurisdiction over such person: . . . (i) Incorporation under or
qualification as a foreign corporation under the laws of this Commonwealth.”
(quoting 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5301 (West 1990))).
411. 814 F.3d 619 (2d Cir. 2016).
412. Id. at 622.
413. Id. at 622–23.
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between thirty and seventy employees, and appointed a designated
agent for service of process there.414
Because the alleged conduct of Lockheed that caused the plaintiff’s
injury was not the result of Lockheed’s contacts with Connecticut, the
court concluded that there was no basis to assert that Lockheed was
subject to the specific jurisdiction of the Connecticut courts.415
Rather, the plaintiff argued “that Lockheed consented to having those
courts in Connecticut exercise general jurisdiction over it by register-
ing—years earlier—to do business in the state and appointing an
agent to receive service of process there.”416  Additionally, Plaintiff ar-
gued that:
the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Daimler AG v. Bauman, ––– U.S.
––––, 134 S.Ct. 746, 187 L.Ed.2d 624 (2014), and Goodyear Dunlop Tires Oper-
ations, S.A. v. Brown, 546 U.S. 915, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 180 L.Ed.2d 796 (2011),
support the demand for the District Court’s exercise of general jurisdiction
over Lockheed in Connecticut because the company’s contacts with Connecti-
cut were “continuous and systematic” enough to place it “essentially at home”
in the state. Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 761 (quoting Goodyear, 131 S.Ct. at
2851).417
The court turned to the decisions in Goodyear and Daimler to de-
termine whether Lockheed’s contacts with Connecticut were sufficient
to subject it to the general jurisdiction of that state’s courts.418  As the
court noted, under Goodyear and Daimler, “the general jurisdiction in-
quiry ‘is not whether a foreign corporation’s in-forum contacts can be
said to be in some sense continuous and systemic,’ but
rather, . . . ‘whether that corporation’s affiliations with the State
are so continuous and systematic as to render it essentially at home in
the forum.’”419  According to Goodyear and Daimler, the paradigmatic
locus for a corporation to be “essentially at home” is “where it is incor-
porated or where it has its principal place of business.”420
Relying upon Daimler, the Brown court noted:
Only in the “exceptional” case will another jurisdiction be entitled to exercise
such sweeping powers as the use of its adjudicatory authority to decide mat-
ters unrelated to its citizens or to affairs within its borders. Id. at 761 n. 19.
As the Court explained earlier in Goodyear: “A corporation’s ‘continuous activ-
ity of some sorts within a state’ . . . ‘is not enough to support the demand that
the corporation be amenable to suits unrelated to that activity.’ ” 131 S.Ct. at
2856 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318, 66 S.Ct. 154).421
414. Id. at 628.
415. Id. at 625.
416. Id. at 622.
417. Id.
418. Id. at 626–30.
419. Id. at 627.
420. Id.
421. Id.
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In determining whether Brown was such an “exceptional” case, the
court concluded that Connecticut could not be said to be Lockheed’s
“surrogate principal place of business,” nor was Lockheed’s activity
within the state significant in comparison to its overall activity.422
Based on this, the court ultimately concluded that no basis existed for
finding that Lockheed was subject to the general jurisdiction of the
Connecticut courts, reasoning that  “given that it is common for corpo-
rations to have presences in multiple states exceeding that of Lock-
heed in Connecticut, general jurisdiction would be quite
the opposite of ‘exceptional’ if such contacts were held sufficient to
render the corporation ‘at home’ in the state.”423
The court then turned to the question of whether Lockheed con-
sented to the general jurisdiction of the Connecticut courts by regis-
tering to do business and appointing an agent to accept service of
process there.424  The court noted that initially business registration
statutes were “enacted primarily to allow states to exercise jurisdic-
tion over corporations that, although not formed under its laws, were
transacting business within a state’s borders and thus potentially giv-
ing rise to state citizens’ claims against them.”425  Through registra-
tion, the corporation consented “to appear in state court on actions by
a state’s citizens arising from the corporation’s operations in the
jurisdiction.”426
The court noted that Connecticut’s registration statute “nowhere
expressly provides that foreign corporations that register to transact
business in the state shall be subject to the ‘general jurisdiction’ of the
Connecticut courts.”427  However, the court indicated that several
years before Daimler, the Connecticut Appellate Court had in fact
ascribed just such a broad meaning to the statute.428  In Talenti, the
Connecticut Appellate Court held that registration in Connecticut in-
dicates that the corporation is consenting to the general jurisdiction of
Connecticut state courts:
[W]hen a foreign corporation . . . obtain[s] a certificate of authority
and . . . authoriz[es] a public official to accept service of process, it has con-
sented to the exercise of jurisdiction over it by the courts of this state. This
consent is effective even though no other basis exists for the exercise of jurisdic-
tion over the corporation. Such a corporation has purposely availed itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within this state, thus invoking the benefits
422. Id. at 627–30.
423. Id. at 630.
424. Id. at 630–41.
425. Id. at 632.
426. Id. at 633.
427. Id. at 634.
428. Id. at 635–37 (discussing Talenti v. Morgan & Brother Manhattan Storage Co.,
968 A.2d 933 (Conn. App. 2009)).
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and protections of its laws . . . . Therefore, the defendant has voluntarily con-
sented to the personal jurisdiction of it by the courts of this state.429
In Talenti, the court also determined that because “the defendant
[had] consented to jurisdiction, the exercise of jurisdiction by the court
[did] not violate due process.”430
In Brown, the court rejected the rationale of the Connecticut appel-
late court in Talenti, holding that Connecticut’s registration statute
provided “no notice to a corporation registering to do business in the
state that the registration might have the sweeping effect that the
[Connecticut Appellate Court] envisioned.”431  Rather, the text of the
statute “suggests that assent only to specific jurisdiction is what the
statute required.”432
Additionally, despite the clear holding of Pennsylvania Fire, the
court rejected Pennsylvania Fire as a basis for concluding that regis-
tration reflected to consent to general jurisdiction, stating:
[W]e believe that the holding in Pennsylvania Fire cannot be divorced from
the outdated jurisprudential assumptions of its era. The sweeping interpreta-
tion that a state court gave to a routine registration statute and an accompa-
nying power of attorney that Pennsylvania Fire credited as a general
“consent” has yielded to the doctrinal refinement reflected in Goodyear and
Daimler and the Court’s 21st century approach to general and specific juris-
diction in light of expectations created by the continuing expansion of inter-
state and global business.433
Based on this reasoning, the court concluded that “[i]f mere regis-
tration and the accompanying appointment of an in-state agent—
without an express consent to general jurisdiction—nonetheless suf-
ficed to confer general jurisdiction by implicit consent, every corpora-
tion would be subject to general jurisdiction in every state in which it
registered, and Daimler’s ruling would be robbed of meaning by a
back-door thief.”434  The court does acknowledge, however, that
“[w]ere the Connecticut statute drafted such that it could be fairly con-
strued as requiring foreign corporations to consent to general jurisdic-
tion, we would be confronted with a more difficult constitutional
question about the validity of such consent after Daimler.”435
429. Talenti, 968 A.2d at 940 (internal citations omitted).
430. Id. at 941 n.14.
431. Brown, 814 F.3d at 637.
432. Id.
433. Id. at 639.
434. Id. at 640 (emphasis added).
435. Id. at 640.  As the court noted:
Though a defendant may ordinarily, through free and voluntary consent
given (for example) in a commercial agreement, submit to jurisdiction a
court would otherwise be unable to exercise, we decline to decide here
whether consent to general jurisdiction via a registration statute would
be similarly effective notwithstanding Daimler’s strong admonition
against the expansive exercise of general jurisdiction. Jurisdictions
other than Connecticut have enacted registration statutes that more
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Additionally, Chatwal Hotels & Resorts LLC v. Dollywood Co.  and
Keeley v. Pfizer Inc. are two federal district court cases that briefly
address jurisdiction based on registration post-Daimler.  Both courts
concluded that the mere fact that a foreign corporation was registered
to do business in a state was insufficient to provide courts of that state
general jurisdiction over the foreign corporation.436
The problem is, both courts failed to engage in any real analysis.
They never mentioned that multiple cases after Daimler have found
that consent-by-registration remains a valid path to jurisdiction.  In
fact, they never even mentioned consent jurisdiction as a separate doc-
trine.  Instead, they engaged in a limited general jurisdiction analysis
and held that a finding of general jurisdiction would be contrary to the
holding of Daimler that merely doing business in a state is not
enough.437  Interestingly, the court in Chatwal Hotels rested its con-
clusion in part on a quote from Gucci America, Inc. v. Weixing Li, in
plainly advise the registrant that enrolling in the state as a foreign cor-
poration and transacting business will vest the local courts with general
jurisdiction over the corporation. E.g., 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5301(a)(2)(i)-
(ii). The registration statute in the state of New York has been defini-
tively construed to accomplish that end, and legislation has been intro-
duced to ratify that construction of the statute. See Monestier, supra, at
1344–45 & nn. 2 & 4. And some of our sister circuits have upheld states’
determinations that in their respective states, registration to do busi-
ness constitutes consent to the exercise of general jurisdiction, and that
due process requires no more: That is, personal jurisdiction by consent of
a corporate defendant is consistent with due process. See Bane, 925 F.2d
at 640 (1991 decision interpreting Pennsylvania statute that expressly
stated that registration “enable[s] the tribunals of [that] Commonwealth
to exercise general personal jurisdiction”); Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines,
Inc., 900 F.2d 1196, 1199–1200 (8th Cir.1990) (reading Minnesota regis-
tration law, as interpreted by that state’s Supreme Court, to confer gen-
eral jurisdiction over common carrier). These two decisions reason that,
because of its nature as a personal right, a defendant may consent to
personal jurisdiction without regard to what a due process analysis of its
contacts would yield. See Knowlton, 900 F.2d at 1199 (“Consent is the
other traditional basis of jurisdiction, existing independently of long-arm
statutes.”). Similarly, in an approach emphasizing the amenability to
waiver of personal jurisdiction as an individual right, applicable to a de-
fendant corporation without regard to the due process analysis, the Su-
preme Court has upheld the assertion of personal jurisdiction as a
sanction for failure to comply with jurisdictional discovery, holding such
failures “may amount to a legal submission to the jurisdiction of the
court, whether voluntary or not.” Bauxites, 456 U.S. at 704–05, 102 S.Ct.
2099. From these sources, it could be concluded that a carefully drawn
state statute that expressly required consent to general jurisdiction as a
condition on a foreign corporation’s doing business in the state, at least
in cases brought by state residents, might well be constitutional.
Id. at 640–41.
436. Chatwal Hotels & Resorts LLC v. Dollywood Co., 90 F. Supp. 3d 97, 105 (S.D.N.Y.
2015); Keeley v. Pfizer, Inc. No. 4:15CV00583 ERW, 2015 WL 3999488, at *4
(E.D. Mo. June 1, 2015).
437. Chatwal, 90 F. Supp. 3d at 104–05; Keeley, 2015 WL 3999488, at *4.
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which the Second Circuit cautioned against adopting “an overly ex-
pansive view of general jurisdiction.”438  The court apparently failed
to realize, however, that the Gucci court noted, by way of footnote,
that district courts might consider whether defendants have “con-
sented to jurisdiction in New York by applying for authorization to
conduct business in New York and designation of the New York Secre-
tary of State as its agent for service of process.”439
VIII. CONCLUSION: A MIDDLE PATH
With the significant restrictions on the traditional application of
general jurisdiction, the Court has arguably burdened American
plaintiffs to a significant degree.440  Placing greater burdens on plain-
438. Chatwal, 90 F. Supp. 3d at 105 (quoting Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d
122, 135 (2d Cir. 2014)).
439. Gucci, 768 F.3d at 136 n.15 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 1301(a),
1304(a)(6) (McKinney 2016); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 200 (McKinney 2016); Bagdon
v. Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 111 N.E. 1075 (1916) (opinion of Cardozo,
J.); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct 746, 755–56 (2014) (noting that general
jurisdiction defines the scope of a court’s jurisdiction when an entity “has not
consented to suit in the forum”)).
440. As Professor Richard Freer has noted:
Consider the facts in J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd. v. Nicastro. Mr. Nicas-
tro, a citizen of New Jersey, was severely injured at work while using a
machine manufactured in Great Britain.  The manufacturer sold its ma-
chines to a company in Ohio, which then sold them to businesses
throughout the United States.  One machine was sold to Mr. Nicastro’s
employer.  Mr. Nicastro sued the British manufacturer in New Jersey,
and asserted a product liability claim.  The Court held that New Jersey
did not have specific jurisdiction over the British manufacturer.  Many
commentators have criticized this parsimonious view of specific
jurisdiction.
But consider Mr. Nicastro’s plight when the holding in J. McIntyre is
combined with Goodyear and Daimler.  Under traditional, well-under-
stood practice, Mr. Nicastro could have sued the British company in
Ohio. Because the claim arose in New Jersey, it would have to be general
jurisdiction.  The theory, of course, would be that the British company
engaged in “continuous and systematic” activities in Ohio by selling and
marketing all of its products sold in North America to a single Ohio com-
pany.  Had such litigation been pursued, it is likely that the Ohio com-
pany (like John Deere in Ferens, Goodyear USA in Goodyear, and
MBUSA in Daimler) would not have contested general jurisdiction.
Today, however, the British company would challenge jurisdiction and
would prevail.  Why? Because that company is not “at home” in Ohio.  It
is formed and has its headquarters in Britain, so Ohio certainly does not
qualify as a paradigm for home.  Could Ohio qualify for activities-based
general jurisdiction?  Aside from attending trade shows throughout the
country, every contact the British company has with the United States is
in Ohio; the company sold every machine sold in North America to a
business in Ohio.  Nonetheless, Goodyear and Daimler seem to rule out
jurisdiction.  First, general jurisdiction cannot be based upon sales into
the forum.  Second, while Ohio is the site of all of the defendant’s North
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tiffs to seek redress against corporate defendants seems to character-
ize much of the Court’s recent jurisprudence in the area of personal
jurisdiction.441  From J. McIntyre to Goodyear to Daimler, the Court
has consistently made it much more difficult for plaintiffs, even Amer-
ican plaintiffs, to find a convenient forum in which they can pursue
legitimate claims.442  Some of the Court’s concern, as evidenced by
Justice Ginsburg’s opinions in both Goodyear and Daimler, is rooted
in a concern over the international extraterritorial reach of United
States courts.443  However, the Court has gone much further than
American contacts, presumably this is but a small part of the corpora-
tion’s overall worldwide business.
Freer, supra note 11, at 24–25.
441. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, J. McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the Incoher-
ence of the Minimum Contacts Test, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245 (2011); Freer,
supra note 11, at 19–29;  Harrison, supra note 8, at 38–41; Arthur R. Miller, Mc-
Intyre in Context: A Very Personal Perspective, 63 S.C. L. REV. 465 (2012); Henry
S. Noyes, The Persistent Problem of Purposeful Availment, 45 CONN. L. REV. 41
(2012); Todd David Peterson, The Timing of Minimum Contacts After Goodyear
and McIntyre, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 1 (2011) http://www.gwlr.org/
the-timing-of-minimum-contacts-after-goodyear-and-mcintyre/ [https://perma
.unl.edu/P4FR-C6MC].
442. As Justice Sotomayor pointed out in her concurrence in Daimler:
[I]t should be obvious that the ultimate effect of the majority’s approach
will be to shift the risk of loss from multinational corporations to the
individuals harmed by their actions.  Under the majority’s rule, for ex-
ample, a parent whose child is maimed due to the negligence of a foreign
hotel owned by a multinational conglomerate will be unable to hold the
hotel to account in a single U.S. court, even if the hotel company has a
massive presence in multiple States.  See, e.g., Meier v. Sun Int’l Hotels,
Ltd., 288 F.3d 1264 (C.A.11 2002).  Similarly, a U.S. business that enters
into a contract in a foreign country to sell its products to a multinational
company there may be unable to seek relief in any U.S. court if the mul-
tinational company breaches the contract, even if that company has con-
siderable operations in numerous U.S. forums.  See, e.g., Walpex
Trading Co. v. Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos, 712 F. Supp.
383 (S.D.N.Y.1989).  Indeed, the majority’s approach would preclude the
plaintiffs in these examples from seeking recourse anywhere in the
United States even if no other judicial system was available to provide
relief.
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 773 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
443. See Linda S. Mullenix, Personal Jurisdiction Stops Here: Cabining the Extraterri-
torial Reach of American Courts, 45 U. TOL. L. REV. 705 (2014); see also Donald
Earl Childress III, Rethinking Legal Globalization: The Case of Transnational
Personal Jurisdiction, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489, 1544 (2013) (“[A] close rela-
tionship exists between personal jurisdiction and choice of law.”); Ursula Tracy
Doyle, The Evidence of Things Not Seen: Divining Balancing Factors from Ki-
obel’s “Touch and Concern” Test, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 443 (2015) (discussing how the
presumption against extraterritoriality precludes Alien Tort Statute claims un-
less they “touch and concern” the United States sufficiently to overcome the pre-
sumption); Katherine Florey, State Courts, State Territory, State Power:
Reflections on the Extraterritoriality Principle in Choice of Law and Legislation,
84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1119 (2009) (arguing for “a recognition that state
courts and state legislatures embody state power in similar ways and that the
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that in adopting the extremely narrow understanding of general juris-
diction adopted in Goodyear and Daimler.
In today’s global economy, it is rare for a corporation to intention-
ally target one individual state and ignore another.444  In fact, in most
marketing and manufacturing contexts, it is easily foreseeable by the
corporate marketer or manufacturer that its product may be trans-
ported from nation to nation and from state to state.445  Indeed, the
corporation’s goal is to sell its product to willing buyers, wherever they
may be located.  A corporation, in the modern commercial world, with
assistance from national or international marketing campaigns or
through use of the Internet, often seeks to turn entire nations into a
single target market without a thought of addressing individual states
or considering the sovereign interests of individual states.446
Given this reality, the Court must create a clear process whereby
proper personal jurisdiction involving potential corporate defendants
with a national market is easily and predictably analyzed for both spe-
cific and general jurisdiction.447  This is a reality recognized by Jus-
tice Breyer in his concurrence in J. McIntyre, wherein he stated
regarding specific jurisdiction, it is “unwise to announce a rule of
broad applicability without full consideration of the modern-day con-
sequences.”448  Equally unwise is the Court’s complete overhaul of the
historical understanding of general jurisdiction without giving “full
consideration of the modern-day consequences.”449
One such predictable approach would be for state statutes requir-
ing corporations intending to conduct business in that state to register
and appoint an agent for service of process to explicitly state that the
consequence of registration and proper service within the forum as a
result of that registration is that the corporation consents to the juris-
diction of the courts of that state for injuries caused to citizens of that
fundamental concerns about allowing either to regulate across state boundaries
are similar”).
444. Harrison, supra note 8, at 38.
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. Id.  See also Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, The Predictability Principle in Personal
Jurisdiction Doctrine: A Case Study on the Effects of a “Generally” Too Broad, But
“Specifically” Too Narrow Approach to Minimum Contacts, 57 BAYLOR L. REV.
135, 235–236 (2005) (asserting that “registration and appointment of an agent is
not enough to establish consent, except perhaps in those situations in which the
state registration statute is considered explicit enough to constitute actual,
rather than fictional, consent.”).
448. J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2791 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
with Alito, J., concurring).
449. Id.  In J. McIntyre, Justice Breyer asserted that because the “case does not impli-
cate modern concerns, and because the factual record leaves many open ques-
tions, [the case presented] is an unsuitable vehicle for making broad
pronouncements that refashion basic jurisdictional rules.” Id. at 2792–93.  The
same could easily be said about both Goodyear and Daimler.
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state, regardless of where those injuries occurred.450  Such an ap-
proach would strike a balance between the concerns articulated by the
Court in Goodyear and Daimler regarding the international extrater-
ritorial reach of American courts, the burden on large national and
international corporate defendants who might be subject to general
jurisdictions in all states, due process considerations about predict-
ability and coercion, and traditional state sovereignty concerns re-
garding the need of a state to protect its citizens.
Further, while the Supreme Court has not spoken directly on this
issue since Pennsylvania Fire, it is logical that where a foreign corpo-
ration (1) has registered to conduct business in a state, appointing an
agent within the state for the purpose of accepting service of process
within the state, and (2) is actually properly served within that state,
that corporation is subject to jurisdiction in that state under the tradi-
tional understanding of personal jurisdiction dating back to Pen-
noyer.451  In Burnham v. Superior Court of California, the Court held
that service in California on a New York defendant, even when the
defendant was only temporarily present in California, was sufficient
to confer general personal jurisdiction over that defendant in Califor-
nia.452  While Burnham dealt with an individual defendant, Justice
Scalia, writing for the plurality, made clear that it was long estab-
lished that proper service over a foreign defendant within the state
allowed the courts of that state to exercise personal jurisdiction over
450. But see Andrews, supra note 9, at 1074–75 (“Registration statutes . . . remain
coercive and punish nonregistration through fines and forfeiture of the right to
bring suit in local courts.”); Benish, supra note 272, at 16–32; Matthew Kipp,
Inferring Express Consent: The Paradox of Permitting Registration Statutes to
Confer General Jurisdiction, 9 REV. LITIG. 1 (1990); D. Craig Lewis, Jurisdiction
Over Foreign Corporations Based on Registration and Appointment of an Agent:
An Unconstitutional Condition Perpetuated, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 3 (1990) (as-
serting that a corporation’s appointment of an agent for service or process cannot
be used as a basis for general jurisdiction because it results in an unconstitu-
tional burden on a foreign corporation’s ability to transact business in the state);
Monestier, supra note 256, at 1372–1400 (asserting that under any theory (pres-
ence, minimum contacts, or consent), registration and appointment of an agent to
receive service of process in a state fails to provide a valid basis for the exercise of
general personal jurisdiction); Pierre Riou, Note, General Jurisdiction over For-
eign Corporations: All That Glitters Is Not Gold Issue Mining, 14 REV. LITIG. 741
(1995); Lee Scott Taylor, Note, Registration Statutes, Personal Jurisdiction, and
the Problem of Predictability, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1163 (2003); T. Griffin
Vincent, Comment, Toward a Better Analysis for General Jurisdiction Based on
Appointment of Corporate Agents, 41 BAYLOR L. REV. 461 (1989).
451. Hoffheimer, supra note 99, at 600–601; Hoffheimer & Cornett, supra note 239, at
136–38; see also Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) (plurality
opinion of Scalia, J.) (“The short of the matter is that jurisdiction based on physi-
cal presence alone constitutes due process because it is one of the continuing tra-
ditions of our legal system that define the due process standard . . . .”).
452. 495 U.S. at 607, 628.
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that defendant.453  While the Court has not recently explicitly stated
that service within a forum would confer general personal jurisdiction
over a corporate defendant, it would seem logical that the rationale
from Burnham would apply equally to corporate defendants.  In the
oral argument in Goodyear, this was of concern to a number of the
justices.454
453. Id. at 619.  Justice Sotomayor identified this rather bizarre result in her concur-
rence in Daimler, where she wrote:
[T]he majority’s approach creates the incongruous result that an individ-
ual defendant whose only contact with a forum State is a one-time visit
will be subject to general jurisdiction if served with process during that
visit, Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., County of Marin, 495 U.S. 604,
110 S. Ct. 2105, 109 L.Ed.2d 631 (1990), but a large corporation that
owns property, employs workers, and does billions of dollars’ worth of
business in the State will not be, simply because the corporation has
similar contacts elsewhere (though the visiting individual surely does as
well).
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 772–73 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concur-
ring); see also Freer, supra note 11, at 14–19 (discussing natural person’s domicile
and “equivalents”). See generally Cody J. Jacobs, If Corporations Are People, Why
Can’t They Play Tag?, 46 N.M.L. REV. 1 (2016) (arguing “that both the originalist
and fairness-based tests proposed in Burnham support allowing the assertion of
tag jurisdiction over corporations and other entities through instate service on
their officers”).
454. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v.
Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011) (No. 10-76), http://www.supremecourt.gov/
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/10-76.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/U36L-
YJQQ].  For example, Justice Kagan asked counsel for the Goodyear subsidiaries
whether general jurisdiction would be appropriate over Goodyear USA had the
corporation not consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by the North Carolina
court. Id. at 4.  Justice Ginsburg also inquired of the Assistant Solicitor General
as to whether general jurisdiction would be proper based on service of an agent
appointed by a corporation that otherwise lacked continuous and systematic con-
tacts. Id. at 15.  The responses from both counsel informed the Court that there
was a split of authority among the lower courts on this issue. Id. at 5–6, 15–18.
However, the Court chose not to address the issue at that time, thus leaving this
issue open for further resolution.  In discussing this issue, Professor Hoffheimer
has written:
The Court’s decision in Goodyear Dunlop Tires does not resolve an issue
on which lower courts have been divided: whether service of process on
an agent appointed by a corporation to receive process establishes valid
general jurisdiction.  During oral argument, Justices on the Court ex-
pressed keen interest in this issue.
Opinions in both Goodyear Dunlop Tires and Nicastro contain state-
ments that general jurisdiction over corporations exists in the state
where the corporation is “at home,” identified as its place of incorpora-
tion or principal place of business.  Because the opinions do not further
qualify such statements, it is possible to read them as signaling ob-
liquely that the method of service is unimportant.
This is not a plausible reading.  The Court similarly observes, without
qualification, that general jurisdiction over an individual is proper in the
courts of his or her domicile.  This observation hardly signals that the
Court intends to overrule its holding that personal service establishes
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For examples of the distorted results that will occur from a narrow
application of the general personal jurisdiction analysis found in
Goodyear and Daimler, one need only look to the factual situations
seen in Goodyear, Daimler, and J. McIntyre.  In the factual situation
presented in Goodyear, under a narrow reading of the Court’s analysis
in Goodyear and Daimler, not only could the Goodyear foreign subsidi-
aries not be sued in North Carolina for their potential role in the
death of North Carolina citizens, but neither could Goodyear USA, as
North Carolina is neither its place of incorporation nor its principal
place of business.455  Under Goodyear and Daimler, such a result
would arguably occur regardless of how much business, including
manufacturing operations, Goodyear USA conducted in North Caro-
lina.  While Goodyear USA could certainly be sued in Ohio, should the
citizens of North Carolina necessarily be forced to travel to Ohio to
seek redress for injuries potentially caused by Goodyear USA in a non-
North Carolina forum?  The approach taken by the Court in Goodyear
and Daimler simply ignores the burden on plaintiffs who need redress
and ignores the real sovereign interests a state, North Carolina in this
instance, has in protecting its own citizens through its courts.
By way of contrast, the factual scenario presented in Daimler does
not alter the general jurisdiction outcome even were the limited ap-
proach proposed in this Article accepted.456  In Daimler, the plaintiffs
were not United States citizens.  Thus, the sovereignty interests of
California were not at issue at all.  Based on the Court’s analysis in
Daimler, Daimler, as a foreign subsidiary of MBUSA, would not be
subject to general jurisdiction in California because it was, in no way,
“at home” in California, as it neither was incorporated in California
nor was California its principal place of business.  Under the proposal
offered in this Article, Daimler would still not be subject to personal
jurisdiction by the California courts, because Daimler had not regis-
tered to do business in California and had not appointed an agent for
service of process.  Under the proposal set forth in this Article,
MBUSA would also not be subject to general personal jurisdiction by
the California courts on these facts, even if it had registered to do bus-
iness in California, had appointed an agent for service of process, and
actually had been served in California.  This result would occur be-
cause the injuries alleged were not to California citizens and thus,
valid general jurisdiction over an individual.  In describing the places
where corporations are “at home” as analogous to an individual’s domi-
cile, the Court leaves open the possibility that traditional methods of ser-
vice on corporate agents may also support general jurisdiction analogous
to service on an individual.
Hoffheimer, supra note 99, at 600–601.
455. See discussion supra section VI.A.
456. See discussion supra section VI.B.
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California had no sovereign interest in providing redress for these al-
leged injuries.
As Professor Freer noted, the facts of J. McIntyre present yet an-
other wrinkle on this same theme.457  In J. McIntyre, a thirty-year
employee injured his hand while working in October 2001 at his place
of employment, Curcio Scrap Metal.458  The injury occurred while the
employee was using a metal-shearing machine, manufactured by J.
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. (“J. McIntyre”), a business entity incorpo-
rated and operating out of England.459  The machine had been sold in
the United States through an independent exclusive distributor, Mc-
Intyre Machinery America, Ltd. (“McIntyre America”), headquartered
in Stow, Ohio.460
The employee, employed in New Jersey, sued the manufacturer in
New Jersey Superior Court.461  Upon motion by the manufacturer, the
trial court dismissed the action finding that the manufacturer lacked
minimum contacts with New Jersey.462  The New Jersey Appellate Di-
vision reversed in an unreported opinion.463  The Supreme Court of
New Jersey then reviewed the case and concluded that New Jersey
could exercise jurisdiction.464  Subsequently, in an attempt to “answer
decades-old questions left open in Asahi,”465 the U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari.466  In a plurality opinion, Justice Kennedy re-
versed the decision of the Supreme Court of New Jersey and concluded
that New Jersey did not have specific personal jurisdiction over the
out-of-state defendant because of the lack of sufficient contacts by J.
McIntyre with New Jersey.467
If New Jersey did not have specific personal jurisdiction over J.
McIntyre because of the insufficiency of the company’s contacts with
the state, then where may Mr. Nicastro seek redress for his injuries?
As Professor Freer points out, under the pre-Daimler understanding
of general jurisdiction, Mr. Nicastro could have sued J. McIntyre in
Ohio, because the company had “continuous and systematic” contacts
with Ohio through the sale of its machines in Ohio.468  Presumably,
post-Daimler, this would not be true, because J. McIntyre could not be
457. Freer, supra note 11, at 14–19, 24–25.
458. Nicastro v. J. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 578 (N.J. 2010), rev’ d, 131
S. Ct. 2780 (2011).  The device blades severed four fingers from the hand of the
employee. Id. at 577.
459. J. McIntyre Mach., 131 S. Ct. at 2786.
460. Nicastro, 987 A.2d at 578.
461. J. McIntyre Mach., 131 S. Ct. at 2786.
462. Nicastro, 987 A.2d at 578.
463. Id.
464. J. McIntyre Mach., 131 S. Ct. at 2786.
465. Id. at 2785.
466. Id. at 2786.
467. Id. at 2791.
468. Freer, supra note 11, at 14–19, 24–25.
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considered “at home” in Ohio, despite its extensive contacts with the
state, in that J. McIntyre neither was incorporated in Ohio nor was
Ohio its principal place of business.  Thus, post-Daimler, the only fo-
rum available in which Mr. Nicastro, an American citizen, could seek
redress would be in the United Kingdom.  This bizarre and distorted
result completely ignores the interest of Mr. Nicastro as a plaintiff
who was certainly injured, potentially because of J. McIntyre’s con-
duct, and the sovereign interests of New Jersey in protecting its citi-
zens through its courts.
How would the proposal offered in this Article change the outcome
for Mr. Nicastro, if at all?  If one assumes that Pennsylvania Fire and
Burnham control with no limitations, then to the extent J. McIntyre
registered to do business in Ohio, appointed an agent to accept service
on its behalf in Ohio, and was served in Ohio, then arguably under the
broadest reading, J. McIntyre would be subject to suit by Mr. Nicastro
in Ohio, even though the cause of action arose in New Jersey.  How-
ever, under the narrower proposal offered in this Article, unless J. Mc-
Intyre registered to do business in New Jersey, appointed an agent to
accept service on its behalf in New Jersey, and was then served in
New Jersey, Mr. Nicastro would still be left with the United Kingdom
as his only forum for redress.
Both the benefits and the limitations of the narrow proposal put
forth in this Article can be seen in the three factual scenarios de-
scribed above.  As the Court is likely to be faced with a case in the
near future raising the issue of whether registration and appointment
can serve as a basis for general personal jurisdiction in any circum-
stance, this Article attempts to posit a middle ground between a broad
reading of registration and appointment statutes that would confer
broad general jurisdiction over corporations and a very narrow read-
ing of those statutes which, when coupled with the Court’s decision in
Goodyear and Daimler, would greatly burden plaintiffs in seeking re-
dress for legitimate injuries.
In this context, some have argued that reading registration and
appointment statutes to grant general personal jurisdiction over cor-
porate defendant either based on a theory of consent or of presence
violates various constitutional rights of corporate defendants, either
by violating due process rights, imposing unconstitutional conditions,
or by violating the Dormant Commerce Clause.469
469. See discussion supra section VII.A; see also Cassandra Burke Robertson &
Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, A Shifting Equilibrium: Personal Jurisdiction,
Transnational Litigation, and the Problem of Nonparties, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 643, 662–66 (2015) (discussing the application of the unconstitutional-condi-
tions doctrine to consent and personal jurisdiction through registration).  Rhodes
and Robertson note the following in discussing the application of the unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine to consent to personal jurisdiction through registration:
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One mechanism for addressing these potential constitutional con-
cerns, to the extent deemed legitimate, is for the Court to correct its
mistake in Daimler where it concluded that the traditional fairness
and reasonableness analysis recognized in International Shoe is not
required in the determination of the existence of general personal ju-
risdiction in a particular case.470
As Justice White pointed out in his decision in World-Wide Volk-
swagen, the traditional idea of minimum contacts as a basis for deter-
mining whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction was appropriate
had two distinct purposes in the doctrine of personal jurisdiction.471
These two purposes were the protection of defendants against the bur-
den of litigating in a “distant or inconvenient forum” and the protec-
tion of state sovereignty by defining the limits of that sovereignty.472
First, for consent to be appropriate, the bound party should have legally
sufficient notice of the terms of the exchange.  Consent to jurisdiction
under registration statutes, then, cannot extend beyond the limits speci-
fied by either the terms of the relevant statutes or their case-law
interpretation.
Second, for such an exchange to be an exchange—and not merely a fic-
tional implied consent that the Supreme Court has disavowed—the state
must have something to exchange.  States are generally free to enact
conditions on the conferral of benefits, as long as the conditions do not
violate the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine or another constitu-
tional prohibition.  When the state possesses this authority, the corpora-
tion is merely trading a guarantee of its amenability to suit in the forum
in exchange for the privileges of conducting business operations within
the state and accessing the state’s courts.  This bargain is certainly not
unconscionable with respect to the corporation’s amenability for those
claims implicating state sovereign interests in regulating conduct sub-
ject to its substantive law or in redressing harms suffered by its citizens.
The state has substantial interests in providing both a forum for its in-
jured residents and a mechanism for serving nonresident corporations.
Corporations obtaining economic benefits from their in-state business
activities do not suffer an undue burden by being required to answer for
their obligations to state citizens.  Indeed, the burden imposed on such
corporations is often less than the burden imposed by contractual con-
sent to jurisdiction or forum selection clauses (especially those in form
contracts)— and such clauses have routinely been upheld by the Su-
preme Court.  The corporation has a choice if it views the state-imposed
burdens as excessive: it can refrain from “doing business” in the state
and not appoint the required agent.  We therefore propose that a state
can typically obtain a nonresident corporation’s consent to jurisdiction
through the appointment of a registered agent for service of process, as a
necessary condition for the corporation to conduct intrastate business
and access forum courts, in those actions implicating sufficient state sov-
ereign interests, including state interests in prescribing the substantive
law governing the action or providing a convenient forum for its injured
residents.
Id. at 662–664.
470. See discussion supra section VI.B.
471. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291–92 (1980).
472. Id. at 292.
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Justice White explained that the first function, that of protecting de-
fendants, is “typically described in terms of ‘reasonableness’ or ‘fair-
ness.’”473 International Shoe and its progeny drew no distinction
between specific personal jurisdiction and general personal jurisdic-
tion in the application of a reasonableness analysis as part of a court’s
jurisdictional analysis.474  Thus, any concern regarding burdens on
corporate defendants if their compliance with explicit registration and
appointment statutes resulted in a state court being able to exercise
general personal jurisdiction over them in the limited circumstances
described in this Article could be addressed by the reintroduction of
the traditional fairness factors in all analysis of personal jurisdiction.
473. Id.
474. See discussion supra Parts III–IV.
